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Job Insecurity†
By Aditya Kuvalekar and Elliot Lipnowski*
We examine the relationship between job security and product­
ivity in a fixed wage  worker­firm relationship facing match quality 
 uncertainty. The worker’s action affects both learning and  current 
productivity. The firm, seeing worker behavior and outcomes, 
makes a firing decision. As bad news accrues, the firm cannot 
commit to retain the worker. This creates perverse incentives: the 
worker strat egically slows learning, harming productivity. We fully 
characterize the unique equilibrium in our  continuous­time game. 
Consistent with some evidence in organizational psychology, the 
relationship between job insecurity and productivity is  U­shaped: 
a worker is least productive when his job is moderately secure.  (JEL J23, J24, J63, M51)
A wide body of literature, from economics and management to organizational psychology, studies the effects of job insecurity on employee productivity. 
The results are ambiguous. Repenning (2000) alludes to two competing schools 
of thought regarding the consequences of job insecurity. The “drive in fear” school 
argues that fear of job loss can boost productivity by motivating employees, while 
the “drive out fear” school argues that such fear distorts  decision-making and thus 
harms productivity.
In Only the Paranoid Survive, Intel CEO Andy Grove extols the virtues of fear in 
organizational  decision-making:
The most important role of managers is to create an environment in which 
people are passionately dedicated to winning in the marketplace. Fear 
plays a major role in creating and maintaining such passion … Simply put, 
fear can be the opposite of complacency.
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On the other hand, among W. Edwards Deming’s (1982, 59) 14 key management 
principles is
Drive out fear. No one can put in his best performance unless he feels 
secure … A common denominator of fear in any form, anywhere, is loss 
from impaired performance and padded figures.
Fear has real negative consequences, Deming argues, like the employee who 
“[would] like to understand better the reasons for some of the company’s  procedures, 
but [doesn’t] dare to ask about them (Deming 1982, 61).” In short, fear induces 
employees to be overly cautious, impeding their productivity.
Empirical work, by both economists and organizational psychologists, has also 
found an ambiguous relationship between productivity and job insecurity. Some 
organizational psychologists find positive associations (e.g., Probst et  al. 2007; 
Brockner, Tyler, and   Cooper-Schneider 1992; Sverke and  Hellgren 2001), some 
negative (e.g., Gilboa et  al. 2008, Roskies and   Louis-Guerin 1990, Reisel et  al. 
2010), and some, a more complex relationship (e.g., Staufenbiel and König 2010). 
One study (Selenko et al. 2013) seems to find a  U-shaped relationship: a worker is 
least productive when his job is moderately secure.
Motivated by the above, our goal is to explore the relationship between job 
 insecurity and productivity in an agency framework. To this end, we provide a 
 simple framework of a fixed-wage  firm-worker relationship, where the worker faces 
a firing threat.1 A key feature of our model is that employees are sometimes fired for 
poor performance, as past performance heralds future performance. In our model, 
job insecurity and productivity are endogenously codetermined: fear of job loss 
feeds into worker decisions, and productivity feeds into firing choices. We show that 
this interplay yields a  U-shaped relationship between employee productivity and job 
insecurity.
Model.—We study an infinite horizon, continuous time game between a worker 
and a firm. At any given moment, the firm decides whether or not to continue 
 employing the worker at a fixed flow cost. While employed, the worker collects 
a fixed wage, and chooses an action. The flow of output is stochastically deter-
mined by the worker’s action and a  relationship-specific “match quality” between 
the worker and the firm. The players are symmetrically uninformed about the match 
quality: they both learn from observing the output and the action. Higher actions 
generate both higher expected output and superior information about match quality, 
and so the firm prefers that the worker chooses higher actions.2 We study Markov 
perfect equilibrium of this game, with players’ beliefs about match quality as the 
state.
The players have conflicting interests. The worker is indifferent to firm out-
put and his own action, wanting only to stay employed as long as possible. The 
1 According to the US Bureau of Labor Statistics (see http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/ minimum-wage/
archive/ characteristics-of-minimum-wage-workers-2014.pdf), 58.7 percent of wage and salary workers are paid a 
fixed hourly wage. Thus, we focus on environments without incentive pay, just as Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) did.
2 While maintained throughout the paper for ease of exposition, this assumption is not strictly necessary. See 
Section IVA for a more general model that generates our key results.
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firm,   however,  maximizes profit, and so weighs its expectations of future output 
against the cost of employing the worker. The firm finds it profitable to employ a 
worker if and only if the two are  well-matched.
An important feature of our model is that the worker’s choices are perfectly 
observable, and yet the firm cannot write contingent contracts.3 This yields a more 
tractable model: no player ever has private information (on or off path), so that 
their beliefs about match quality always agree. Given this feature, one can view our 
model as a collective experimentation problem with conflicting interests between 
the firm and the worker. In that sense, our model is substantially related to that of 
Garfagnini (2011), who considers an experimentation problem that is jointly carried 
out by two players. Several substantive modeling differences yield very diff erent 
dynamics, and in particular rule out the variation in productivity over time.4
Results.—We show that our players’ relationship entails a severe agency problem 
and exhibits rich dynamics. Even with the worker’s actions being observable to the 
firm and him being indifferent across actions, a nontrivial agency problem arises. 
Our first main result, Proposition 1, shows that in equilibrium, the firm’s value is as 
if the worker chose the lowest action at all histories. Thus, the enhanced efficiency 
from firing unproductive workers comes at a cost, as formalized by the proposition: 
by distorting incentives, it results in “worse” worker behavior.5 This inefficiency is 
the outcome of two distinguishing features of our model: the firm cannot commit 
to retain an unsuccessful worker, and the worker faces no  high-powered reward for 
success. Collectively, these imply that the worker does not want to create informa-
tion for the firm. Proposition 1 tells us that the agency problem is severe; however, 
it does not tell us how our players actually behave.
Our next main result, Theorem 1, fully describes equilibrium, and shows it is 
unique. Equilibrium play is characterized by three regimes. When the players are 
pessimistic about match quality, the firm immediately fires the worker. When the 
players are optimistic about match quality, the firm continues to employ the worker. 
At such beliefs, enjoying a sense of job security, the worker seeks to “avoid making 
waves” for fear of risking his high status in the firm: he chooses the lowest available 
action. For moderate beliefs, the firm sporadically fires the worker, who in turn 
chooses a higher action than when his job is secure.
As can be seen in Figure  1, the equilibrium exhibits discontinuous behavior 
by both players. The intuition behind this feature comes directly from the firm’s 
incentives at the cutoff where the probationary and optimistic regions meet. In light 
of Proposition 1, this cutoff is the firm’s optimal stopping belief against a worker 
3 Of course, if our firm could write such contracts, the situation would be fundamentally  nonstrategic; given 
observable action, the firm could dictate the worker’s behavior under the threat of firing.
4 In the “observable effort” model of Garfagnini (2011) there is an agent who exerts costly effort and cares 
about the state of the world. His experimentation technology is of the perfectly revealing “good news” Poisson form 
rather than Brownian. His principal can condition his stopping choice on the agent’s current effort rather than only 
on beliefs. If his agent exerts zero effort, experimentation halts completely and, crucially, his principal does strictly 
worse than under no experimentation. Given the last feature, no analogue of Corollary 1 can obtain in the world of 
Garfagnini (2011); see footnote 22.
5 Lazear (1990) argues that reducing employment protection can lead to lower unemployment by making firms 
more efficient. In our model, there is also an associated efficiency loss.
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 strategy of constant (low) action. Standard option value reasoning then tells us that 
the firm’s flow profit is negative just above the cutoff. At the same time, to keep the 
firm indifferent (and so willing to mix) just below the cutoff, the worker must offer 
the firm a flow profit of zero, necessitating a strictly higher action. Discontinuity 
follows.
Our equilibrium features a  nonmonotonic relationship between job security (i.e., 
expected discounted future employment) and productivity (i.e., expected current 
flow profit). We formalize this in Corollary 1. Consider how productivity varies as 
beliefs about match quality—and, with them, the worker’s job security—increase. 
First, in the middle region (which one can interpret as a probationary region), the 
worker barely earns his keep, so that productivity is constant.6 As beliefs pass to 
the (barely) optimistic region, the worker discontinuously switches to the minimum 
action: he is now less productive. As beliefs grow further through the optimistic 
region, the worker’s action remains constant, but his expected match quality with the 
firm increases: he is in expectation more productive. So productivity first decreases 
with job security due to changing worker incentives and then increases with it due to 
worker selection. Thus, our equilibrium provides plausible mechanics that generate 
a  U-shaped relationship.
Moreover, our results may speak to the management debate we reference above. 
Our middle region, with intermittent firing and higher actions than that suggested 
by Proposition 1, tells us why one might “drive in fear”: the threat of firing the 
6 Note, in the pessimistic region, there is no job to lose.
Figure 1. Players’ Strategies
Worker’s action
Pessimistic Probationary Optimistic
Beliefs
Beliefs
Firm’s firing rate
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worker faces at his current status motivates him to work harder. Our optimistic 
region highlights the reason to “drive out fear.” In this region, the worker chooses 
the low action, but not because his job is safe. Rather, he deliberately slows the flow 
of information for fear of entering the more pessimistic regime: future job insecurity 
creates perverse current incentives for the worker.7
In addition to our equilibrium characterization and its consequences for the firm, 
our analysis may be of broader interest for the study of dynamic games. In single 
agent settings, the vast literature on optimal control and optimal stopping yields 
powerful methods for understanding  well-behaved dynamic optimization  problems 
in continuous time.8 Standard results from this literature, however, rely on the 
 decision-maker facing an environment that varies smoothly with the  underlying 
state. In strategic settings, one player’s best response may change  discontinuously 
with the state, and so we may be forced to study the resulting discontinuous 
 environment faced by the other player. Some, but not all, past work avoids this 
issue in modeling strategic settings with only one “large” strategic player.9 In 
our  setting, we extend known smooth pasting techniques to characterize equilib-
rium when  multiple large players’ equilibrium actions may vary discontinuously. 
In a similar vein, we provide a new refinement, termed instantaneous sequential 
 rationality, for continuous time games.10 By characterizing its behavioral implica-
tions in our game, we show that it can be a useful refinement, reducing a continuum 
family of  qualitatively similar equilibria to a unique equilibrium (which is Pareto 
optimal within the family).
7 Indeed, if the firm’s strategy were to employ the worker forever—which it could not do in equilibrium—the 
worker would willingly choose the high action in our setting.
8 See Pham (2009), for example.
9 This assumption is a natural one when one agent has all of the market power. For examples of such settings, see 
Daley and Green (2012) and Board and  Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013). Other settings, such as those of Bolton and Harris 
(1999) and Daley and Green (2020), have multiple large players and yet exhibit continuous equilibrium play, ruling 
out this potential difficulty.
10 See Section III for more details.
Figure 2. Observed Relationship between Job Security and Productivity
Job security
Productivity
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Robustness of Results.—To isolate the relationship between job security and 
 productivity for a single  worker-firm relationship, we have assumed that actions 
are costless, that the worker’s choice is  one-dimensional, that the worker cannot be 
promoted to provide incentives, and that the worker’s wage level does not respond 
to his current marginal product. The extensions outlined in Section IV show that 
our qualitative results are robust to all of these features. With higher actions being 
costly—and thus interpretable as effort—behavior off of the path of play may differ 
from ours, but every equilibrium generates dynamics qualitatively similar to ours; 
similar equilibrium dynamics also obtain if the worker’s action is multidimensional. 
If the worker is paid his current marginal product as in Holmström (1999)—or any 
other wage exhibiting sufficiently  low-powered incentives—equilibrium play is 
identical. If, in a common  nonpecuniary instance of  low-powered incentives, the 
worker is promoted when past success is above a threshold, then equilibrium play is 
richer: the worker chooses the high action when near enough to promotion, but the 
 non-monotonicity of Corollary 1 persists.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section I, we describe our 
game and define our equilibrium concept. Section II presents and discusses our main 
results, fully characterizing our unique equilibrium. In Section III, we describe our 
broader contribution to the study of dynamic games in continuous time. Section IV 
details extensions of our model. All proofs are in the Appendix.
I. Our Model
A. The Environment
We study an infinite horizon, continuous time game between a firm and a worker. 
At each instant, the firm decides whether or not to irreversibly fire the worker, while 
the worker chooses an action conditional on not being fired.
The  worker-firm match quality  θ ∈  {0, 1} is symmetrically unknown to the play-
ers, with prior  E  0 θ =  p 0 ∈  (0, 1) . Irrespective of the worker’s action, the  stochastic 
output is profitable on average if and only if he is  well-matched with the firm (some-
thing neither the firm nor the worker knows). The worker’s choice of action, along 
with his productive outcomes, are public. The worker wants to stay employed and 
collect his fixed wage, and so cares about the information that actions generate; to 
isolate the incentive effects of job insecurity, we assume that all actions are costless.
At each instant, the worker makes a choice  A  t ∈  [ a _ ,  _ a] . Over the course of 
 [t, t + dt) , the firm observes this action as well as the resulting (stochastic)  output. The 
players update their beliefs about the match quality, taking into account the action 
chosen. The firm decides whether to continue the relationship or fire the worker.
We stress that no matter what action the worker chooses, our two players always 
(on path and off path) have the same information about the match quality, so that 
there can be no private beliefs.11
11 This stands in contrast to papers on dynamic contracting with (initially) symmetric uncertainty and moral 
hazard, such as Prat and Jovanovic (2014), Demarzo and Sannikov (2017), and Cisternas (2018a). A paper which 
194 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL: MICROECONOMICS MAY 2020
B. Payoffs
We model the firm’s flow profit as a diffusion with drift depending on both the 
match quality and the worker’s action. The firm also incurs a flow cost  c of hiring the 
worker. Let  X  t denote the cumulative output (net of the cost of hiring the worker). 
The law of motion of  X is then
  d X  t =  (θ A  t − c) dt + σd B  t , 
where  { B t } t is a standard Brownian motion.12 The firm’s accrued payoff 
over  [t, t + dt) is  d X  t while employing the worker, and the worker’s accrued  payoff is 
equal to his collected wages  w dt (where  w > 0 is a fixed wage). It may be  natural 
to assume  w = c , but it is not necessary. After the worker is fired, both  players 
have  continuation payoff normalized to zero. Therefore, if the worker is fired at 
( stochastic) time  τ , the firm’s and worker’s payoffs are
  r ∫ 
0
 
 τ
 e −rt d X  t  and r ∫ 0  τ e −rt w d t, 
respectively.
We assume that  a – >  a _ > c > 0 . So the firm would (myopically) strictly want 
to employ a well matched worker and fire a poorly matched worker. By counting 
time, profit, and worker values in different units, we may without loss of generality 
normalize  r = σ = w = 1 .
C. Learning
We assume that the players (symmetrically) revise their beliefs about  worker-firm 
match via Bayesian updating. We assume that players cannot signal what they do 
not know: nobody draws any direct inferences from the firm’s stopping choice 
or the worker’s activity choice. However, the worker’s choice  A  t does indirectly 
affect learning, as it affects the stochastic law of  d X  t , and it affects the inferences ( concerning  θ ) the players draw from  d X  t .
Let  P t ∈  (0, 1) be the time  t public expectation of  θ , i.e.,  P t is the commonly 
held belief at time  t that the worker and firm are well matched. Sometimes, it is 
more convenient to work with the state variable  Z  t ≔ log  ( P t /(1 −  P t )) . It is, 
of course,  informationally equivalent: any  z is associated with a probability 
 p (z) ≔ 1/ (1 +  e −z ) . As noted in Daley and Green (2012) and in Bolton and Harris (1999), the process  Z is a linear transformation of the output  X , and is therefore a 
Brownian diffusion process. Whenever the firm has not yet stopped, the belief vari-
able  Z follows the law of motion
(1)  d Z  t =  A  t [d X  t −  ( 1 __2  A  t − c) dt] . 
shares our observability assumption is Kostadinov and Kuvalekar (forthcoming), studying symmetric learning in 
a  relational contract.
12 The exact functional form is not crucial for our qualitative results. See Section IVA for details.
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Equivalently,  P follows
(2)  d P t =  A  t  P t (1 −  P t ) [d X  t −  ( P t  A  t − c) dt] 
(3)  =  A  t  P t (1 −  P t ) [ A  t (θ −  P t ) dt + d B  t ] . 
D. Player Strategies
Informally, our players both observe the history  ( A  t ̃ ,  X  t ̃  )  t ̃ < t  , and our worker and 
firm choose action  A  t and stopping rate  S  t , respectively (where  S  t = ∞ corresponds 
to firing the worker with certainty).13
We restrict our attention to Markovian strategies using beliefs about the match 
quality as our state variable. Plainly, this simplifying assumption is inadequate for 
describing many organizational settings. With access to formal contracts, relational 
incentives, and other means for actors to tie each others’ hands, organizations with 
the same current information concerning match quality could realistically engage in 
very different relationships going forward. Having said that, we will show that this 
extreme modeling assumption enables tractable analysis of a unique equilibrium 
in our game, which still gives rise to rich relational dynamics. Our hope is that, 
for organizations that work outside the realm of such devices, our results repre-
sent something real about the relationship between job security and productivity. 
In Subsection IVE, we briefly and informally explore how relational incentives can 
alter the  worker-firm relationship.
The first convenience our Markovian restriction affords is that the stochastic 
process of players’ beliefs is uniquely determined by the realized path of output. 
Indeed it follows from Nakao (1972) that the law of motion of  Z as governed by 
equation (1) has a unique strong solution when players follow Markov strategies as 
defined below.
DEFINITION 1: A Markov strategy profile is a pair  (a, s) , where
 (i ) a :  [0, 1] →  [ a _ ,  a –] is piecewise Lipschitz. 
 (ii ) s :  [0, 1] →  [0, ∞] is piecewise continuous;  s is piecewise Lipschitz in any 
interval  ⊆  [0, 1] over which  s is bounded; and  s −1 (∞) is closed.
Let the space of above specified strategies for the worker be  and for the firm be   .
13 Notice that this formulation rules out the possibility that the firm stops with probability exactly  q ∈  (0, 1) 
at a given history. Given that we will focus entirely on Markov strategies, this is in some sense a normalization. 
Indeed, as the belief process will have volatility locally bounded away from zero, the set of times  t at which  P t is  p 
has no isolated points: the belief diffusion will repeatedly quickly revisit  p . Therefore, if the firm fired the worker 
with probability  q ∈  (0, 1) every time  P t = p , then the probability of having fired the worker as of time  t + ϵ 
would be  1 for any  t such that  P t = p and any  ϵ > 0 . 
We conjecture that an analogous argument should rule out any cumulative stopping process that fails to be 
absolutely continuous, but such an argument is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, conservatively, we can think 
of the “stopping rate” form of firm behavior as a smoothness assumption.
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Given  P 0 ∈  [0, 1] and  (a, s) ∈  ×  , define the induced stochastic 
 processes  { P t ,  A  t ,  S  t } t by letting  A  t = a ( P t ) and  S  t = s ( P t ) , and letting  { P t } t  follow 
equation (2).
In an abuse of notation, we identify any two strategies for a player that agree 
almost everywhere, and (in the case of the firm) are  finite-valued on the same set. 
For the remainder of this paper, every equation concerning players’ behavior (as a 
function of beliefs) is understood to hold only up to this equivalence.
Certain classes of strategies seem natural. For a fixed action  a ˆ ∈  [ a _ ,  a –] , the 
worker has a constant control strategy, with action  a ˆ chosen at every belief; we 
simply call this strategy  a ˆ ∈  . For a belief  p ∈  [0, 1] , the firm has a simple 
 cutoff  strategy  s p ∈  with  s p |  ( p,1]  = 0 and  s p |  [0, p]  = ∞ . As is standard, if the 
worker uses a constant control, then the firm optimally uses a simple cutoff.
By allowing  S  t ∈  (0, ∞) , we have permitted the firm to mix. That is, 
 whenever  S  t > 0 , the probability of stopping over  [t, t + dt) is approximately  S  t dt . 
As we will see, this mixing is (for many parameter values) a necessary component 
of equilibrium. In the present definition of a worker strategy, we allow the worker to 
observably choose interior actions, but we have ruled out the possibility of explicit 
mixing. The latter is purely for notational convenience.
E. Defining Equilibrium
As the stochastic differential equation 1 uniquely pins down the law of 
motion of beliefs given a strategy profile  (a, s) ∈  ×  and initial condition 
 P 0 = p ∈  [0, 1] , there is no need to separately specify  history-dependent beliefs in 
the specification of an equilibrium.
We can define the worker’s value as
  v ( p | a, s) =  E  a, s [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −t e − ∫ 0  t S τ dτ dt  |  P 0 = p] , 
where the term  e − ∫ 0 t S τ dτ is understood to be zero when  S  τ = ∞ for some  τ ∈ [0, t) .
Similarly, the firm’s value can be defined as
  π (p | a, s) =  E  a, s [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −t e − ∫ 0 t S τ dτ d X  t  |  P 0 = p] . 
As is typical, we define equilibrium as a strategy profile satisfying mutual best 
response. Given our focus on strategies that are Markovian with respect to beliefs, 
and given that no proper subset of  (0, 1) is absorbing,14 we define best response 
from every possible posterior belief.
14 This follows from equation (1), which implies that  Z has uniformly bounded drift and a volatility that is 
uniformly bounded below.
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DEFINITION 2: In our setting, we define equilibrium to be a pair of strategies 
(a, s) ∈  ×  such that, for all  p ∈  (0, 1) :
 (i ) Worker Optimality: The control solves the worker’s problem, i.e.,
  a ∈  arg max 
 a ˆ ∈
  v ( p | a ˆ , s) . 
 (ii ) Instantaneous Sequential Rationality: If  s = ∞ in a neighborhood of  p , 
then the distance between  a Δ ⁎ (p | a, s) and  a (p) tends to zero as  Δ does, where, 
for any  Δ > 0 ,
  a Δ ⁎ ( p | a, s) 
 ≔  arg max 
 a ˆ ∈ [ a _ , a –] 
 {(1 −  e −Δ ) +  e −Δ E [v( P Δ | a, s)  |  P 0 = p,  A  τ =  a ˆ ∀ τ ∈ [0, Δ)] } .
 (iii ) Firm Optimality: The stopping rule solves the firm’s problem, i.e.,
  s ∈  arg max 
 s ˆ∈ π (p | a,  s ˆ) . 
An unrefined equilibrium is a pair  (a, s) ∈  ×  satisfying conditions (i ) and (iii ) (but not necessarily (ii )) above.
Worker optimality and firm optimality are standard, requiring that the  strategy 
 profile constitute a Nash equilibrium in each subgame. The requirement of 
 instantaneous sequential rationality is the only nonstandard one, its form being 
 tailored for continuous time. We want to require that the worker is behaving  optimally 
at every history. In a discrete time analogue of our game, a currently hired worker 
knows his action will be able to affect the public belief until the next period, and so 
he best responds to that knowledge; instantaneous sequential rationality  recovers 
this intuition, having a worker respond as though he will at least retain his job for 
the next instant. As sequential rationality does in discrete time dynamic games, the 
instantaneous sequential rationality refinement constrains equilibrium play by lim-
iting off path behavior to be credible.
While our focus is on characterizing the unique equilibrium of our game 
(in Theorem 1), we also characterize the play associated with all unrefined  equilibria 
(Proposition 2), and show that the former is a Pareto optimum within the latter.
II. Main Results
The relationship in our model is a simple one. Neither player possesses any 
 private information about match quality, nor about past behavior. The firm benefits 
(both myopically and from additional information) from having the worker choose 
a high action, while the worker suffers no direct cost from providing this  benefit. 
Therefore, if the firm could commit to an  action-contingent firing strategy, the 
worker could optimally choose the high action, and the firm would solve a simple 
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optimal stopping problem given this worker behavior.15 However, as the following 
proposition clarifies, even with no direct conflict of interest within a given period, a 
conflict arises in equilibrium: the firm’s equilibrium profit is as though the worker 
always chooses the firm’s least favorite action.
PROPOSITION 1: In any equilibrium  (a, s) , the firm’s value function is 
 π ( · | a, s) =  sup  s ̃∈ π ( · |  a _ ,  s ̃) .
Let us now sketch a proof of the proposition, formally proven (as are all other 
formal results) in the Appendix.
We first show that the given value,  sup  s ̃∈ π ( · |  a _ ,  s ̃) , is an upper bound on the 
firm’s equilibrium value. Recall that employing the worker is profitable if and only 
if he is  well-matched to the job. Given this, the firm is certain to fire the worker if 
they become sufficiently pessimistic about their match quality. Firing will therefore 
happen in the future with positive probability. The worker’s value function is then, 
at every belief  P t for which the firm is sure to retain him, strictly lower than his static 
wage. As
  v ( P t ) dt ≈   1 dt ⏟Today’s wage +  (1 − dt)  E [dv ( P t ) ]  
Value increment
 , 
it must be that  E [dv ( P t ) ] < 0 . Beliefs being a martingale, this means that  v is 
strictly concave around such a belief. Consequently, the worker does not want to 
generate  mean-preserving spreads in beliefs, i.e., he wishes to slow the flow of 
 information. Therefore, at any belief at which the firm’s value is strictly positive, 
the worker must choose the low action ( a _ ). While the firm may have many optimal 
responses to the worker’s equilibrium strategy, one such optimal stopping rule is 
the strategy  s 0 , which entails firing the agent as soon as his belief reaches  π −1 (0) . 
Pairing this firm strategy with the worker’s equilibrium strategy,  a , then generates 
precisely the same path of play as does  ( a _ ,  s 0 ) : the worker chooses the low action 
until beliefs reach  π −1 (0) , and then he is fired. In particular,  π (a,  s 0 ) and  π ( a _ ,  s 0 ) are 
equal. But the former is a lower bound (by firm incentives) on the firm’s equilibrium 
payoff, and the latter is exactly  sup  s ̃∈ π ( · | a _ ,  s ̃) , delivering the bound.
Conversely, the firm’s equilibrium value is weakly higher than its hypothetical 
value if the worker were to choose the low action everywhere. Indeed, any other 
action generates higher flow profit and better information, both of which benefit the 
firm.
Proposition 1 says that the ongoing nature of a  worker-firm relationship entails 
a severe agency problem. However secure the worker’s job is today, he can never 
enjoy absolute job security in the future, as there is always a positive probability 
of bad news forcing the firm’s hand.16 This future contingency contaminates the 
15 A “forcing” strategy of firing the worker the instant he deviates to choose  A  t ≠  a – would make this 
 incentive compatible for the worker.
16 If our firm could commit to retain the worker irrespective of performance, the worker could optimally choose 
a –; this arrangement would benefit the firm for some parameter values. The benefit of term limits, as proposed 
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 relationship today. The ability to fire the worker is a valuable option for the firm, 
who may learn  ex  post that the worker is not profitable to retain, but this threat 
comes at a cost, hindering productivity on the job.
By narrowing the possible equilibrium payoffs for the firm, Proposition 1  provides 
some useful information on the form of equilibrium behavior. There is some simple 
cutoff rule  s  p 
–
 , which is a best response to the fixed control strategy  a _ , and one can 
 further deduce that  s  p 
–
 is a firm best response to the equilibrium  control  a . However, 
( a _ ,  s  p – ) is not generally an equilibrium. To see why, consider the incentives of a 
worker who finds himself facing  s  p 
–
 and yet employed at belief  p <  p –. His job 
is so insecure that he has nothing to lose. Being (instantaneously) sequentially 
 rational, he will seek to maximize the probability that the posterior belief exceeds 
p – the  following instant. His best possible chance of escaping the imminent firing 
threat is to choose an action that speeds up learning, i.e., induces the largest possible 
 variation in posterior beliefs. This is achieved by choosing the highest action at such 
beliefs. Consider the implications of this behavior if the high action is much more 
productive than the low one. Firm incentives unravel: given high action in the firing 
region, the firm has a strict incentive to lower its cutoff.
The argument of the above paragraph teaches us two things. First, the profile 
( a _ ,  s  p – ) cannot be an equilibrium because of worker incentives below the cutoff. 
Second, if the productivity gap between actions is high enough ( a –p – − c > 0 ), 
then firm incentives just below the putative cutoff preclude  s  p 
–
 being used at all in 
equilibrium.17
If higher actions are sufficiently valuable to the firm, then a simple cutoff strategy 
cannot be used in equilibrium; and a similar argument will show that the firm  cannot 
use any deterministic firing rule in equilibrium in this case. However, given the 
low action, the firm is barely willing to retain the worker at  p –. How then, can it be 
induced to retain the worker (even stochastically) when even more pessimistic? The 
worker must willingly choose higher actions over this mixing region.
Our main theorem, a complete characterization of the unique equilibrium, 
 formalizes the above intuition.
THEOREM 1: There is a unique equilibrium  ( a ⁎ ,  s ⁎ ) . In equilibrium, there are two 
cutoffs  0 <  p _ ≤  p – < c / a _ such that:
 (i ) Above  p –, the firm never fires the worker, who in turn chooses the lowest 
action.
 (ii) Between  p _ and  p –, the firm mixes, the worker produces zero expected flow 
profit18 for the firm, and the worker’s value function is affine. As  p increases 
from  p _ to  p 
–,  s ⁎ ( p) decreases continuously from  ∞ to some  s _ > 0 .
by Aghion and  Jackson (2016), has a similar intuition. Tying the principal’s hands limits the agent’s scope for 
 inefficient  career-concerned behavior.
17  In the complementary case, when  a –p – − c ≤ 0 , the firm can use  s  p – in equilibrium, with the worker’s behavior 
switching at the same cutoff.
18 That is, his action at such a belief  p satisfies  a ⁎ ( p) p − c = 0 .
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 (iii ) Below  p _ , the firm immediately fires the worker.
When higher actions are sufficiently valuable, the middle region is nondegenerate.19
We prove the theorem in the Appendix, but it may be instructive to sketch the 
argument that rules out all other candidate equilibria.
Letting  p – be the cutoff belief at which the firm would fire if the worker were 
always to choose the low action, Proposition 1 says that the firm has strictly positive 
continuation value to the right of  p – and zero value to the left of it. Zero value implies 
that the firm’s flow profit  a ( p) p − c must be nonpositive at every belief  p ≤  p –.
Now, let  I be any maximal interval of beliefs below  p – at which the agent enjoys a 
strictly positive continuation value. In particular, the firm’s firing rate is finite over  I . 
Starting from  P t ∈ I , the firm’s continuation profit at  P t+dt ∈ I is certain to be zero, 
and the firm is still willing to retain the worker. This rules out strictly negative flow 
profits: the firm earns zero flow profits over  I . That is, the worker chooses action 
 a ( p) = c / p there. Worker optimality then requires that he be indifferent to 
 creating information, to be willing to choose an interior action:  v| I must be affine. 
But then,  I must have  p – as one of its endpoints. Otherwise, the agent would have a 
zero continuation value at either endpoint, and so (by affinity) could not obtain a 
strictly positive value over  I .
The above argument shows that there is some  p _ ≤  p – such that the firm imme-
diately fires at beliefs below  p _ but not at beliefs in  ( p _ ,  p –] , and the firm receives 
zero flow profit over  ( p _ ,  p –] . Next, instantaneous sequential rationality says that the 
worker will choose the high action to the left of  p _ , in a  last-ditch effort to escape 
the firing region.20 By firm optimality, the high action must be enough to secure 
 nonnegative flow profit over  ( p _ ,  p –] but not enough to induce strictly positive flow 
profit to the left of  p _ ; these features pin down the cutoff  p _ exactly.
Notice that, as shown in Figure 3, both players’ behavior is discontinuous in the 
unique equilibrium. Discontinuity of the firm’s retention decision is interpretable: 
employees with very similar performance histories can experience markedly differ-
ent treatment from their employers in equilibrium.
The region  ( p _ ,  p –) can be thought of as a probationary period. Here, the employee 
works harder in the face of an imminent threat of losing his job. Should enough 
good news accrue, the employee is “promoted” to a region above  p –, where he faces 
no such imminent threat. The discontinuity of the worker’s behavior is broadly 
consistent with an observation made by Engellandt and  Riphahn (2005), Ichino 
and Riphahn (2005), and Jacob (2013): employees’ productive effort systematically 
falls as a probationary period ends.
19 More precisely,  p _ <  p – if and only if  a – >  a _ +  (( a _ − c)/δ) , where  δ = (1/2) ( √ _________  1 +  (1/(8 a _ )) − 1) > 0 .
20 A similar mechanism emerges ( on-path) in Varas (2019), wherein a manager takes a risky  short-termist action 
at the brink of dismissal. See also Anderson and Cabral (2007) for a similar appeal (in an R&D competition model) 
to endogenously arising preferences over volatility.
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Figure 3. Players’ Strategies
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While our instantaneous sequential rationality refinement delivers a unique 
 equilibrium, the analysis leading to Theorem 1 still characterizes the equilibrium 
play ranging across all unrefined equilibria.21
PROPOSITION 2: For every  p L ∈  [ p _ ,  p –] , there is an unrefined equilibrium in 
which:
 (i ) Above  p –, the firm never fires the worker, who in turn chooses the low action.
 (ii ) Between  p L and  p –, the firm mixes, the worker produces zero expected flow profit 
for the firm, and the worker’s value function is affine. As  p increases from  p L 
to  p –, the firm’s firing rate decreases continuously from  ∞ to some  s _ > 0 .
 (iii ) Below  p L , the firm immediately fires the worker.
Moreover, every unrefined equilibrium is of the above form, and the unique (refined) 
equilibrium is Pareto optimal within the class.
A. Job Security and Productivity
In our model, a worker’s continuation value  V t is his expected discounted 
future employment, i.e., his job security. If he chooses  A  t while believed to be 
 well-matched to the firm with probability  P t  , then his current expected flow 
profitability, i.e., his productivity, is  A  t  P t − c . Therefore, in equilibrium, belief 
about match quality is a common determinant of both job security and produc-
tivity. Given this, a relationship between the latter two follows directly from the 
theorem.
COROLLARY 1: Consider an equilibrium  ( a ⁎ ,  s ⁎ ) , and let  v ⁎ be the associated 
worker value function. For any level  v ∈  (0, 1) of job security, there is a unique 
belief  p (v) ∈  (0, 1) such that  v ⁎ (p (v)) = v . Let  F (v) ≔ p (v)  a ⁎ (p (v)) − c , 
the  worker’s current productivity at this level of job security. Then there exists 
v ˆ ∈ [ 0, 1) such that:
 (i ) On  (0,  v ˆ),  F is zero.
 (ii ) On  ( v ˆ, 1) ,  F is strictly convex and strictly increases from negative to positive.
When higher actions are sufficiently valuable (as described in footnote 19),  v ˆ > 0 .
When the worker’s job is very insecure (below  v ˆ), he is productive enough to 
barely be worth employing for the moment. A more secure worker chooses the  lowest 
21 A proof of this proposition is a straightforward modification of the proof of Theorem 1; we therefore omit it. 
One follows the same line of argument, without an appeal to Lemmas 12 and 13, and replacing  p _ with  p L in 
Lemmas 14 and 15.
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action, but what are the productivity implications? A very secure worker is produc-
tive, on average, because he is likely to be  well-matched to the firm. A  moderately 
secure worker (with job security barely above  v ˆ) loses money for the firm today: he 
is rationally retained only for option value reasons.
Thus, equilibrium play in our model generates a  U-shaped pattern: a worker is 
least productive when his job is moderately secure.22
III. Dynamic Games in Continuous Time
Beyond studying the relationship between job security and productivity, we hope 
that our paper contributes more broadly to the study of dynamic games in  continuous 
time. First, we provide a refinement, instantaneous sequential  rationality, which 
 mirrors discrete time intuitions and yet has refining power in our  continuous time 
application (and hopefully elsewhere). Second, we extend the direct  applicability 
of known methods from continuous time dynamic optimization to settings in 
which multiple ( long-lived, strategic, “large”) players interact and may behave 
discontinuously.
A. A Sequential Rationality Refinement
Our environment gives cause to consider players’ optimal behavior at contin-
gencies they never expect to reach in equilibrium, i.e., off the path of play. Indeed, 
consider a belief at which the firm plans to immediately fire the worker. How should 
the worker behave, if he finds himself mysteriously employed at such a belief?
In a  discrete-time setting, the worker would take his current employment as 
given, and would seek to maximize his prospects from the next period onward. 
In continuous time, “the next period” will arrive immediately. Thus, the worker is 
indifferent: his choice is inconsequential to his future. This is unsatisfactory if one 
22 The assumption that the firm finds it profitable to employ the  well-matched worker even when he is  choosing  a _ 
plays an important role here. Without this assumption, the unique equilibrium would entail worker productivity of 
zero, as in the model of Garfagnini (2011).
Figure 5. Observed Relationship between Job Security and Productivity
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wants to interpret the continuous time model (as we do) as simply a mathematically 
convenient approximation of a discrete time model.
We offer a refinement of MPE for continuous time dynamic games, termed 
instantaneous sequential rationality, whose intuition is drawn from sequential ratio-
nality in discrete time. Analogous to a discrete time setting, we assume that a player 
responds optimally, taking for granted that his current decision will be relevant for 
the next instant. More formally, at an  off-path state, we consider the worker’s hypo-
thetical optimal action  a Δ if he were sure to retain his job for the next  Δ > 0 units 
of time. Our refinement then requires his behavior be a limit of  a Δ as  Δ vanishes.
While the “period length” implicit in our refinement is small, there are behavioral 
implications. In our model, absent instantaneous sequential rationality, Proposition 2 
delivers a continuum family of equilibria with distinct  on-path behavior. Our 
 refinement yields a unique selection (of a Pareto optimal member) from this family.
Ours is not the first paper to invoke specific refinements in a  continuous-time 
game to reproduce intuitions from a  discrete-time analogue. For instance, see Ortner 
(2019). While we do not presently develop a general theory of instantaneous sequen-
tial rationality, we are hopeful that some incarnation of it can be fruitful in future 
applications as well.
B. Dynamic Optimization Methods with Multiple Players
Stochastic control in continuous time yields powerful methods that have been 
applied to dynamic games.23 Two prevalent approaches to solving decision prob-
lems in continuous time involve the  Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation asso-
ciated with a  forward-looking player’s incentives.
The first is the verification approach, which focuses on sufficient  conditions 
for a given candidate policy to be optimal for a decision-maker.24 The second is 
to show that the decision-maker’s value function necessarily satisfies smoothness 
properties and derive necessary conditions of optimal play that  follow from the HJB. 
In The Art of Smooth Pasting, Dixit (1993) heuristically derives  optimal policies 
in many dynamic optimization problems in this way. As described in Strulovici 
and  Szydlowski (2015), value functions will exhibit some smoothness and HJB 
equations will be satisfied as long as the underlying optimization problem is suffi-
ciently smooth.
The most important limitation of the above methods in strategic situations is that 
one player’s behavior—and therefore the environment faced by the other optimiz-
ing player—may be discontinuous in equilibrium. Theorem 1 shows that this hap-
pens in our game. Given this complication, one must extend existing tools to apply 
either of the two approaches. On intervals (of the space of beliefs) where players’ 
23 See, for example, Board and  Meyer-ter-Vehn (2013); Bohren (2019); Cisternas (2018b); Daley and Green 
(2012); Daley and Green (2020); Dilmé (2017); Kolb (2015, 2019); Orlov, Skrzypacz, and Zryumov (2018); Varas 
(2019); Varas, Marinovic, and Skrzypacz (2018); and Chavez (2019).
24 The analyst heuristically derives a candidate policy for the decision maker, and with it a candidate value 
function. A verification theorem then says: if the value function is sufficiently smooth and the candidates satisfy 
the HJB, then the candidates are in fact optimal. For example, see Pham (2009) for optimal control verification 
theorems and Øksendal (2003) for an optimal stopping verification theorem.
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behavior is Lipschitz continuous, nothing new is required to show that value func-
tions are  C 2 and HJB equations are satisfied. At beliefs where our firm changes its 
behavior discontinuously, but the firing rate is locally bounded, we derive a smooth 
pasting condition for the worker. The argument applies the viscosity approach (see 
Crandall, Ishii, and Lions (1992), for instance) to stochastic optimal control.25 With 
piecewise  C 2 value functions and smooth pasting in hand, we are able to derive use-
ful necessary conditions toward characterizing equilibrium in our setting.
IV. Extensions
Our model is a stylized one, but it is also flexible. In this section, we consider 
some extensions of our model and briefly describe how the  worker-firm relationship 
is affected.
A. Richer Worker Controls
For ease of exposition, our leading model consists of a  one-dimensional action for 
the worker to take at each time. A reasonable alternative, however, is for a worker to 
make a broader, multidimensional decision about how to spend his time, somewhat 
analogous to Holmström and Milgrom (1991).
To generalize our leading model, suppose the worker chooses  A  t ∈ Σ , where  Σ 
is a compact convex subset of some Euclidean space. Action process  { A  t } t induces 
an accrued payoff process satisfying
  d X t =  [β ( A  t ) + μ ( A  t ) θ − c] dt + σ ( A  t ) d B  t , 
where  β, μ, σ : Σ → ℝ are all continuous functions, and  μ and  σ are strictly   
positive.
We make the following assumptions on the environment.
ASSUMPTION 1:
 (i ) There is a unique  a _ [resp.  a –] in  Σ that minimizes [maximizes]  μ ( · ) /σ ( · ) .
   There is a unique  a $ 
0 [resp.  a $ 1 ] in  Σ that maximizes  β ( · ) [maximizes 
 β ( · ) + μ ( · ) ].
 (ii )  a $ 0 =  a $ 1 ≡  a $ .
 (iii )  a $ ≠  a _ .
We do not see the first part of the assumption as economically substantive. For 
instance, suppose  Σ were the convex hull of finitely many extreme points and each 
25 Notice, in our equilibrium, the worker’s value function has exactly one kink, depicted in Figure 4, at a belief 
where the firm’s stopping rate explodes.
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of  {β, μ, σ} were affine, so that actions could be interpreted as choices of how the 
worker will divide his time across these finitely many activities. Then, for generic 
choice of  {β, μ, σ} (which are pinned down by the values they take on the extreme 
points), the first assumption would hold.
The second assumption is substantive but also meaningful. It will, for instance, 
hold if  β and  μ vary weakly comonotonically, so that actions are unequivocally 
ordered in terms of flow productivity. The third assumption is also substantive, but 
we think this is the “less special” case. Indeed, in the affine case described in the 
 previous paragraph, if the worker were choosing how to divide his time between 
many activities, then the opposite condition ( a $ =  a _ ) would be very special. We 
note that, for our leading model with  one-dimensional action, taken literally,  a $ 
would be equal to  a _ if myopically  profit-enhancing actions generated worse, rather 
than better, information.
In the bigger model sketched above, the analysis of our paper goes through with 
little change. As worker incentives hinge solely on information in equilibrium, 
Proposition 1 holds exactly, so the firm has the same profit across all equilibria. 
Similarly, instantaneous sequential rationality pins down the worker’s behavior 
 off-path, and a  three-region structure analogous to Theorem 1 obtains. The agent 
plays  a – in the lower region and  a ¯ in the top region. Zero flow profits for the firm pins down the behavior in the middle region.
Note, however, that if  a $ ≠  a –, then there can be multiple beliefs that make it 
simultaneously possible for the firm to receive  nonpositive flow profit from  a – (the 
worker’s  off-path action) and zero flow profit from some other action. Consequently, 
we might obtain multiple equilibria that differ in the left cutoff of the mixing region, 
and so corresponding to different worker payoffs. Note that this multiplicity is 
ruled out in our leading model, which has the special feature that  a $ =  a –. (There is 
another, less economically important, multiplicity if  Σ is multidimensional, which 
is that the worker will typically have multiple distinct actions that keep the firm 
indifferent at beliefs in the mixing region.) In spite of this multiplicity, an analogue 
of Corollary 1 holds equally in this more general model.26
B. Costly Effort
One reasonable interpretation of a worker’s actions is his choice of how hard to 
work. One could imagine that higher effort both increases his expected flow  output 
and makes said output more responsive to match quality. Under this  interpretation, 
a more natural payoff assumption would be that higher effort is costly to 
the worker.
If the worker suffers a private cost of exerting effort—consider the case of a 
 linear cost—the observable implications of our model are very similar. Unrefined 
equilibrium still consists of a  three-region structure, with firing in the pessimistic 
region, mutual mixing in the middle region, and low effort with no firing in the 
26 Just as in the baseline model, the middle region can be degenerate or  non-degenerate. Here,  v ˆ > 0 only in 
the latter case.
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optimistic region.27 That is, the family of unrefined equilibria of the game with 
costly effort is similar to that for our leading model: each has the same  three-region 
structure, with the left cutoff varying across equilibria. However, with costly effort, 
instantaneous sequential rationality requires the worker to instead exert low effort in 
the pessimistic region. Therefore, every unrefined equilibrium is now  path-equivalent 
to a refined equilibrium.
C. Varying Wages
Suppose the worker receives a wage that varies with his standing in the firm. If 
his wage  w ( p) is weakly concave in belief  p (for example, it could be linear as in 
Holmström 1999), then our main results again go through.28
This clarifies that ours is a model of job insecurity paired with  low-powered 
 incentives. In particular, the logic of Proposition 1 relies on the worker facing 
job insecurity following poor performance and no steep reward following good 
performance.
Kostadinov and  Kuvalekar (forthcoming) analyze a related setting (albeit 
in  discrete time and with costly effort) with  time-varying discretionary wages. 
Their focus is on  constrained-surplus-maximizing,  non-Markovian equilibrium.29 
The  differing  predictions of our model and that of Kostadinov and  Kuvalekar 
( forthcoming) are  substantive. In particular, in contrast to our Theorem 1, their agent 
takes higher actions in that model as the players become optimistic—productivity is 
 monotonically increasing in job security.
D. Promotion
One way of providing incentives in an ongoing  worker-firm relationship is 
through promotions. Our model can accommodate this.
Suppose there is an exogenous cutoff  p ˆ above which the worker has exogenous 
continuation value  w ˆ upon reaching  p ˆ . For instance, the worker could be tenured 
with wage  w ˆ . If  w ˆ ≤ w , then one can show that the structure of our equlibrium in 
Theorem 1 persists: even the lure of tenure cannot incentivize a currently untenured 
worker to choose the high action.
More interesting is the case where  w ˆ > w : a worker is unambiguously better 
off once promoted. We can construct an equilibrium using similar reasoning to that 
of the baseline model. As the worker nears the promotion threshold, the possibil-
ity of promotion serves as a  high-powered incentive: he chooses the high action, 
aiming to accelerate this reward. One can show that this equilibrium will exhibit 
a  four-regime structure, as in Figure 6, with a new  high-action regime at the most 
27 In this model, for equilibrium to exist, the worker must be allowed to mix rather than simply choosing an 
interior effort level. In the middle region, he mixes over  { a _ ,  a –} to give the firm a flow payoff of zero.
28 It would then also be natural to allow for the firm’s cost of retaining the worker to depend on expected match 
quality, e.g., if  c ( · ) = w ( · ) . In this case, we would also want to assume that  a _ p − c ( p) is strictly increasing in  p , 
so that a higher expected match quality leads to higher flow profit.
29 Although arbitrary history dependence is, in principle, allowed, it is without loss of optimality for payments 
to condition only on the current beliefs about match quality and on behavior in the most recent period. This result 
reflects a standard principle for relational contracts with transferable utility (e.g., Levin 2003).
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optimistic beliefs. Just as in our leading model, the region with firm mixing may be 
degenerate.
E. Beyond Markovian Play
It is well known that modeling  non-Markovian play in  continuous-time settings 
with observable behavior brings conceptual subtleties, in particular concerning 
how one defines a player’s strategy space, and how one maps a strategy profile 
into a  realized path of play.30 Hence, one may be required to explicitly model 
 continuous-time play as a limit of  discrete-time play (as in Simon and Stinchcombe 
(1989)), possibly foregoing much of the analytical tractability of  continuous-time 
methods. In part for this reason, we follow the literature in focusing our attention on 
Markovian play.
While rigorously formalizing continuous time strategies is beyond the scope of 
this paper, let us heuristically demonstrate how, it seems, relational incentives can be 
 profit-enhancing for our modeled employment relationship. To see this, we restrict to 
the case (see footnote 19) that the mixing region from Theorem 1 is  nondegenerate. 
Consider a  two-phase relationship, as depicted in Figure 7. In both phases, players 
30 This subtlety can be sidestepped in settings with imperfect public monitoring (e.g., Sannikov 2007), by 
focusing attention on equilibrium in public strategies. There, the feasible paths of public outcomes not varying with 
players’ behavior, defining players’ strategies and the induced law for outcomes is more straightforward.
Figure 6. Players’ Strategies with Promotion at  p ˆ if  w ˆ > w 
p
p
Firm's strategy
a¯
¯
¯a
c
p
a(p)
p^
Worker’s strategy
s (p)
VOL. 12 NO. 2 209KUVALEKAR AND LIPNOWSKI: JOB INSECURITY
behave exactly as in the unique equilibrium of Theorem 1, except in the mixing 
region. In phase 1, at beliefs in  (  p _ ,  p –] , the firm retains the worker ( s = 0 ) with cer-
tainty, and the worker chooses  a –. As soon as anybody deviates from the prescribed 
play of phase 1, the players immediately and permanently move to phase 2. In this 
phase, over  (  p _ ,  p –] , the firm fires the worker immediately, and the worker chooses  a _ . 
If credible, this play makes the firm strictly better off than does our Markovian 
 equilibrium. In particular, in contrast to Proposition 1, the firm derives a strictly 
positive profit from every prior belief above  p _ .
Given Proposition 2, one easily sees that phase 2 describes an unrefined equi-
librium. To verify firm incentives in phase 1, notice that continuation profits are 
always nonnegative, so that there is never an incentive to deviate to fire. Moreover, 
at beliefs below  p _ , retaining the worker would result in a negative flow payoff, fol-
lowed by immediate reversion to phase 2, yielding negative total profit. We now 
turn to the worker. Outside of (  p _ ,  p –], his incentives are qualitatively similar to in 
our Markovian equilibrium. In (  p _ ,  p –], the worker has a strictly positive continuation 
value, while any deviation leads to immediate termination. Thus, this code of play 
is  self-enforcing.
Recall that, in line with Proposition 2, every unrefined equilibrium is 
 profit-equivalent to our refined equilibrium. Thus, without instantaneous sequen-
tial rationality, it appears that relational incentives can be strictly  profit-enhancing. 
However, the above construction fails this refinement:  middle-region play in the 
Markovian phase 2 is not instantaneously sequentially rational. We are at this point 
unsure of whether the firm can profit from relational incentives while respecting this 
additional constraint. We view formalization of a model of  non-Markovian equilib-
rium for this game, and the resolution of this question about life inside our firm, as 
an exciting avenue for future work.
V. Concluding Remarks
In this article, we have explored the relationship between job security and 
 productivity in organizations with  low-powered incentives and limited  commitment. 
The potential for a  U-shaped relationship has imprints of two quite different 
 managerial styles. The “drive in fear” approach of Intel's Grove suggests that appro-
priately deployed threats can help combat complacency in the workplace. This 
principle is reflected at moderate beliefs in our model, where the threat of firing 
is nontrivial and the worker takes higher actions. The “drive out fear” school of 
Figure 7. Non-Markovian “Strategies”
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Deming points to a lurking hazard of job insecurity: workers will fear taking riskier 
actions, and this fear distorts organizational decision-making. This force describes 
optimistic beliefs in our model, where the worker takes inefficiently low actions for 
fear of his future employment.
Beyond the applied analysis of our model, we hope that our paper might be of 
broader interest for the study of dynamic games in continuous time. In particular, our 
“instantaneous sequential rationality” refinement mirrors  discrete-time intuitions 
and selects a unique equilibrium in our model. Moreover, the viscosity approach 
adapted herein seems especially convenient for proving  smooth-pasting properties 
in dynamic games for which individual incentives yield discontinuous play. We are 
hopeful that both of these contributions prove useful in analyzing other dynamic 
interactions of economic interest.
Mathematical Appendix
A. Technical Preliminaries
Players’ equilibrium value functions might be wild. In particular, as one play-
er’s behavior might change discontinuously with beliefs—and may be required 
to by his/her own best response property—neither value function is known to be 
the  optimal value function to a  well-behaved decision problem. Even so, one can 
obtain various regularity properties, which will be helpful for bringing the toolset of 
 stochastic calculus to bear in understanding our setting.
LEMMA 1: Given any  (a, s) ∈  ×  , the value functions  π ( · | a, s) , v ( · | a, s) and 
the optimal value functions  sup  s ̃∈ π ( · | a,  s ̃) ,  sup  a ̃∈  v ( · |  a ̃, s) are continuous on 
(0, 1) .
PROOF: 
Given  0 < q < p < q + ϵ < 1 , let  { P t p } t denote the belief 
 process starting at  P 0 = p , and define the  P p -measurable stopping time 
 τ q, ϵ p ≔ inf {t ≥ 0 :  P t p ∉  (q, q + ϵ) } .
To begin with, we prove the following claim: For any  s ∈  and  q ∈  (0, 1) , 
there are real constants  K, L > 0 and  ϵ > 0 such that
  | v ( p | a, s) − v (q | a, s) | ,  | π ( p | a, s) − π (q | a, s) | ≤ K E  a ( τ  q, ϵ p ) + L  p − q _____ϵ 
for all  a ∈  .
Toward the claim, fix  (a, s) ∈  ×  and  q ∈  (0, 1) , and let 
 g ∈  {v ( · | a, s) , π ( · | a, s) } . Then there is a bounded, piecewise Lipschitz 
function  f :  [0, 1] → ℝ such that31
  g ( p) =  E  a [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −t  e − ∫ 0 t s (Pτ) dτ f ( P t ) dt  |  P 0 = p] . 
31 Indeed  f ( p) = 1 if  g = v ( · | a, s) , and  f ( p) = a( p)p − c if  g = π ( · | a, s) .
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For now, focus on the case of  s (q) < ∞ . Let  ϵ ∈  (0, 1 − q) be small enough to 
ensure  s|  (q,q+ϵ)  is bounded above by a constant  s – ∈  ℝ + . Let  β t p ≔  e −t  e − ∫  0 ts ( P  t ˆ p ) d t ˆ 
and  τ  p ≔  τ q,ϵ p . Then, for any  p ∈  (q, q + ϵ) :
  |g( p) − g(q) | =  |  E a [ ∫ 0 ∞ β t  p f ( P t p ) dt] − g(q) | 
 =  |  E a [ ∫ 0  τ p  β t  p f ( P t p ) dt +  β  τ  p   p g ( P  τ  p  p ) ] − g(q) | 
 =  |  E a { ∫  0   τ  
p 
 β t  p f ( P t p ) dt −  (1 −  β  τ  p   p ) g(q) +  β  τ  p   p [g ( P  τ  p  p ) − g(q)] } | 
 =  |  E a { ∫ 0  τ 
 p 
 β t p [ f ( P t p ) −  (1 + s ( P t ) ) g(q)] dt +  β  τ  p  p [g ( P  τ  p  p ) − g(q)] } | 
 ≤  E a  ∫ 0  τ  p  β t p | f ( P t p ) −  [1 + s ( P t p ) ] g(q) | dt +  E a  β  τ  p   p  | g ( P  τ  p  p ) − g(q) | 
 ≤  E a  ∫ 0  τ  p  | f ( P t p ) −  [1 + s ( P t p ) ] g(q) | dt 
  + | g(q + ϵ) − g(q )| Pr a { P t p = q + ϵ} . 
So let  K ≔  ∥ f ∥ ∞ +  (1 +  s –) |g (q) | and  L ≔ | g (q + ϵ) − g (q) | . Then, 
 |g ( p) − g (q) | ≤ K E  a ( τ  p ) + L  (( p − q)/ϵ) , as  P t p is a martingale.
Now consider the case of  s (q) = ∞ . Let  τ ˆp ≔ inf {t ≥ 0 :  P t p = q} . Then
  |g (p) − g (q) | =  | E a [ ∫ 0 ∞ β t p f ( P t p ) dt] − g (q) | 
 =  | E a [ ∫ 0  τ ˆ p  β t p f ( P t p ) dt +  β  τ ˆp  p g (q) ] − g (q) | 
 =  | E a [ ∫ 0  τ ˆ p  β t p f ( P t p ) dt] | 
 ≤  E a  ∫ 0  τ ˆ p  | f ( P t p ) | dt, 
so that letting  K ≔  ∥ f ∥ ∞ (with any  L, ϵ ) completes the proof of the claim.
Now, standard dynamic programming arguments, together with the  martingale 
property of beliefs, tell us that  h ( p) ≔  sup a∈  E a ( τ  q,ϵ p ) is concave in  p , so 
that  sup a∈  E a ( τ  q, ϵ p ) =  E  a _  ( τ  q,ϵ p ) .
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Therefore, we can find constants  K, L, ϵ > 0 such that, for every  p ∈  (q, q + ϵ) , 
the ( control-independent) number,
  M p = K  E  a _  ( τ  q,ϵ p ) + L  p − q _____ϵ , 
is a uniform upper bound for  { | v ( p | a, s) − v (q | a, s) | ,  | π ( p | a, s) − π (q  | a, s) | : a ∈ } . 
Finally,  M p → 0 as  p → q because  E  a _  ( τ  q,ϵ p ) does.
The above argument implies that  v ( · | a, s) , π ( · | a, s) are  right-continuous at  q 
for fixed control, and that  sup a∈ v ( · | a, s) is  right-continuous there. An identical 
 argument shows that these functions are  left-continuous there as well.
Finally, fix any  a ∈  . The optimal value function  π =  sup s∈ π ( · | a, s) is a 
supremum of continuous functions, and so is  lower-semicontinuous. Therefore, its 
zero set is closed, so that  s ≔  ∞ |  π −1 (0)  ∪  0 |  [0,1] \ π −1 (0)  is an element of   . It is easy 
to see that  s is a firm best response to  a , so that  π = π ( · | a, s) is continuous.
All that remains is to check continuity at an endpoint  p ∈  {0, 1} . Notice that32 
for any  ϵ, ϕ ∈  (0, 1) , there exists  ϵ′ ∈  (0, ϵ) such that
  inf 
a∈  E a [ ∫ 0 ∞ e −t  1 | P τ −p|<ϵ∀τ∈ [0, t]  dt] ≥ ϕ 
whenever  P 0 is within  ϵ ′ of  p . Therefore:
 •  If  s ( p) = ∞ , continuity33 of  s in a neighborhood of  p implies that the value 
functions tend to zero near  p .
 •  If  s ( p) < ∞ , then play is Lipschitz in a neighborhood of  p . It follows that the 
limiting worker payoff is  1 and the limiting firm payoff is  a ( p) p − c .
In either case, the limiting payoff agrees with the payoff at  p itself by direct com-
putation. ∎
LEMMA 2: Fix  0 ≤  p 0 <  p 1 ≤ 1 . Suppose  s ∈  is such that  s|  [ p 0 ,  p 1 ]  is 
 finite­valued and Lipschitz, and  a ∈  such that  a|  [ p 0 ,  p 1 ]  is Lipschitz. 
Let  v ⁎ ≔  sup a∈ v ( · | a, s) and  v ≔ v ( · | a, s) . Then  v ⁎ , v are  C 2 on  [  p 0 ,  p 1 ] 34 and 
satisfy:
  0 =  1 __
2
 [a (p) p (1 − p) ] 2 v″ (p) −  [1 + s ( p) ] v ( p) + 1 ,
  0 =  sup 
 a ˆ ∈ [ a _ , a –] 
 { 1 __2  [ a ˆ p (1 − p) ] 2  v * ″ ( p) −  [1 + s ( p) ]  v ⁎ ( p) + 1} . 
32 This can be seen by boundedness of  [ a _ ,  a –] and the law of motion (1).
33 This is the only place in the paper where piecewise continuity of  s is required. In particular, it could be 
replaced with the weaker condition that  lim  p ˆ →p s ( p ˆ ) = ∞ if  p ∈  {0, 1} and  s (p) = ∞ , with no change to our 
results.
34 Where derivatives at  p 0 ,  p 1 are taken to be limits of derivatives.
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Moreover, if a  C 2 function  f :  [ p 0 ,  p 1 ] → ℝ satisfies
  0 =  1 __
2[a ( p) p (1 − p) ] 
2
 f ″ ( p) −  [1 + s ( p) ] f  ( p) + 1 
together with the boundary conditions  ( f  ( p 0 ) , f ( p 1 ) ) =  (v ( p 0 ) , v ( p 1 ) ) , 
then  f =  v|  [ p 0 ,  p 1 ]  ; similarly for  v ⁎ .
PROOF: 
This follows immediately from (Krylov 2009, Chapter 1, Theorem 5). To apply 
that result, we note that any control  a ∈  that is optimal among all admissible 
controls is clearly optimal within the restricted class . ∎
In our setup the firm solves an optimal stopping problem. In the terminology of the 
previous section, the firm chooses the stopping rate  s ( p) . Standard  game-theoretic 
reasoning tells us that if  s ( p) ∈ (0, ∞ ), then the firm must be indifferent between 
stopping and continuing. Therefore, fixing the worker’s strategy, we can only focus 
on the firm’s stopping strategies that are pure strategies. That is,  s (x) ∈  {0, ∞} . In 
other words, the firm decides a stopping time  τ .
The potential difficulty is that the firm’s stopping problem may not be 
 well-behaved,  as the worker’s behavior—and thus the flow payoffs and 
 volatility that the firm faces—can change discontinuously with the state. In 
spite of this  problem, the next result allows one to verify that a given firm strat-
egy is in fact a best response. The lemma is close to Theorem 10.4.1 from 
Øksendal (2003).
LEMMA 3: Let  a ∈  . Suppose  ψ :  [0, 1] →  핉 + and  p ˆ ∈  [0, 1] satisfy the 
 following properties:
 •  ψ is  C 1 and piecewise  C 2 .
 •  ψ|  [0,  p ˆ ]  = 0 .
 •  For a.e.  p ∈  [0, 1] ,
  ψ ( p) −  1 __2[a ( p) p (1 − p) ] 
2
 ψ″ ( p) ≥ a ( p) p − c, 
with equality if  p >  p ˆ .
Then  ψ = π ( · | s  p ˆ  , a) =  max s∈ π ( · | s, a) . That is,  s  p ˆ  is an optimal strategy, 
 yielding firm value function  ψ .
PROOF: 
Fix  p ∈  (  p ˆ , 1) , and consider the belief process  { P t } t defined by  a ∈  
and  P 0 = p. 
Let  τ ⁎ ≔ inf {t :  P t ∉  ( p ˆ , 1) } , and let  τ be an arbitrary  { P t } t -measurable ( stochastic) stopping rule.
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By Itô’s formula,
 e −τ∧n ψ ( P τ∧n ) = ψ ( p) +  ∫ 0 τ∧n e −u [− ψ ( P u ) +  1 __2  [a ( P u )  P u (1 −  P u ) ] 2 ψ″ ( P u ) ] du
 +  ∫ 
0
 
τ∧n
 e −u ψ′ ( P u ) [a ( P u )  P u (1 −  P u ) ] d B u 
  ⇒ ψ( p) =  e −τ∧n ψ ( P τ∧n ) +  ∫ 0 τ∧n e −u [ψ ( P u ) −  1 __2  [a ( P u ) P u (1 −  P u ) ] 2 ψ″ ( P u ) ] du
 −  ∫ 
0
 
τ∧n
 e −u ψ′ ( P u ) [a ( P u )  P u (1 −  P u ) ] d B u . 
As the integrand of the stochastic integral is bounded, we can take expectations, 
yielding:
  ψ ( p) = E e −τ∧n ψ ( P τ∧n ) + E ∫ 0 τ∧n e −u [ψ ( P u ) −  1 __2  [a ( P u ) P u (1 −  P u ) ] 2 ψ ( P u ) ] du 
 ≥ E e −τ∧n ψ ( P  τ n  ) + E ∫ 0 τ∧n e −u [a ( P u )  P u − c] du .
By dominated convergence,
  ψ ( p) ≥ E e −τ ψ ( P τ ) + E ∫ 0 τ e −u [a ( P u ) P u − c] du. 
As  τ was arbitrary, we conclude that  ψ ( p) ≥  sup s∈ π ( p | a, s) .
In the above argument, if  τ =  τ ⁎ , then the inequalities hold with equality, so that
  ψ ( p) = E e − τ ⁎  ψ ( P  τ ⁎  ) + E ∫ 0  τ *  e −u [a ( P u )  P u − c] du = 0 + π ( p | a,  s  p ˆ  ) . 
Together, we have
  ψ ( p) ≤ π ( p | a,  s  p ˆ  ) ≤  sup 
s∈
 π ( p | a, s) ≤ ψ (p) . 
Recall that  p ∈  ( p ˆ , 1) was arbitrary, so that (by Lemma 1)  π ( · | a,  s  p ˆ  ) =  sup s∈ π ( · | a, s) = ψ on  [ p ˆ , 1] . On  [ 0,  p ˆ ] , we see  π ( · | a,  s  p ˆ  ) = 0 = ψ .
Now, take any  p ∈  [0,  p ˆ ) , and consider the belief process  { P t } t defined 
by  a ∈  and  P 0 = p . Let  τ – ≔ inf {t :  P t ∉  (0,  p ˆ ) } , and let  τ be an arbitrary 
 { P t } t - measurable (stochastic) stopping rule. Now,
 E ∫ 
0
 
 τ
 e −t [a ( P t ) P t − c] dt = E ∫ 0  τ∧ τ – e −t [a ( P t ) P t − c] dt + E ∫ τ∧ τ –  τ e −t [a ( P t ) P t − c] dt
 ≤ E ∫ τ∧ τ –  τ e −t [a ( P t ) P t − c] dt = E 1  _ τ≤τ ∫  _ τ  τ e −t [a ( P t ) P t − c] dt
 ≤ E 1  _ τ≤τ  e − _ τ  sup 
s∈
 π ( P τ | a, s) dt = E 1  _ τ≤τ  e − _ τ  sup 
s∈
 π ( p ˆ | a, s) dt
 = 0. 
VOL. 12 NO. 2 215KUVALEKAR AND LIPNOWSKI: JOB INSECURITY
As  τ was arbitrary, we have  sup s∈ π ( · | a, s) ≤ 0 on  [0,  p ˆ ) as well. ∎
Since we know that  v is  C 2 over any interval 
where  s is  finite-valued and Lipschitz, the only difficulty is at the (isolated) dis-
continuities of  s . In what follows, we show that smooth pasting obtains even at 
these problem points.
LEMMA 4: Let  p ∈  (0, 1) be such that  s ( p) is finite,  s – be an upper bound for 
s in a neighborhood of  p , and  σ _ ∈  (0,  a _ p (1 − p) ) a lower bound for volatil­
ity in the same neighborhood. Let  v = v ( · | a, s) for some fixed  a ∈  , or let 
 v =  sup a∈ v ( · | a, s) :
 (i ) If  ψ :  [0, 1] → ℝ is  C 2 and convex,  ψ ( p) = v ( p) , and  v (q) > ψ (q) for 
 q ≠ p in some neighborhood of  p , then  (1 +  s –) v ( p) ≥ 1 + (1/2) σ _ 2 ψ″ ( p) . 
 (ii ) If  ψ :  [0, 1] → ℝ is  C 2 and concave,  ψ ( p) = v ( p) , and  v (q) < ψ (q) 
for  q ≠ p in some neighborhood of  p , then  v ( p) ≤ 1 + (1/2)  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( p) . 
The proof of these results is based on the  so-called viscosity approach to differen-
tial equations. While  pre-existing results do not carry over directly, our proof closely 
mimics arguments from Pham (2009).
PROOF: 
That  s ( p) is finite and  ψ continuous imply  ψ ( p) = v ( p) > 0 , so that  ψ > 0 
near  p .
Fix some  δ > 0 small enough that  s ≤  s –,  σ ≥  σ _ , and  0 < ψ ≠ v on 
( p − δ, p + δ) \ {p} . Fix some sequence  { p m } m ⊆  ( p − δ, p + δ) \ {p} con-
verging to  p . Let  η m ≔ v ( p m ) − ψ ( p m ) , which converges to zero by continuity 
of  v .
Let  { P u a,  p m  } u denote the belief process associated with  control  a ∈  given 
 P 0 
a,  p m  =  p m . Define the stopping time  τ m a ≔ inf {u ≥ 0 : | P u a, p m  −  p m | ≥ δ / 2} ∧  √ _ | η m |.
Given any  ζ > 0 , define a sequence of controls  { a m } m ⊆  as follows: 
if  v = v ( · | a, s) , let  a m ≔ a ; otherwise, if  v =  sup a∈ v ( · | a, s) , let  a m satisfy
 E [ ∫ 0  τ m a  e −u  e − ∫ 0 u s ( P  u ˆ  a m , p m  ) d u ˆ du +  e − τ m  a m    e − ∫ 0  τ m  a m   s ( P  u ˆ  a m , p m  ) d u ˆ v ( P  τ m a   a m , p m  ) ] ≥ v ( p m ) − ζ √ _ | η m |, 
which is achievable by some  a m by the principle of optimality. As a shorthand, 
let  P m ≔  P  a m ,  p m  and  τ m ≔  τ m  a m  . 
For  r = 1, 1 +  s –, Itô’s formula delivers
  e −r τ m  ψ ( P  τ m  m ) = ψ ( p m ) − r ∫ 0  τ m  e −ru ψ ( P u m ) du 
 +  ∫ 
0
 
 τ m 
 e −ru  1 __
2
 [a ( P u m )  P u m (1 −  P u m ) ] 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) du 
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 +  ∫ 
0
 
 τ m 
 e −ru a  ( P u m ) 2  P u m (1 −  P u m ) (θ −  P u m ) ψ′ ( P u m ) du 
 +  ∫ 
0
 
 τ m 
 e −ru a ( P u m )  P u m (1 −  P u m ) ψ′ ( P u m ) d B u . 
Taking expectations (note,  ψ is bounded), together with  η m ψ″ ≥ 0 , gives us
 η m {E e −r τ m  ψ ( P  τ m  m ) − ψ ( p m ) } 
 =  η m {− rE ∫ 0  τ m  e −ru ψ ( P u m ) du + E ∫ 0  τ m  e −ru  1 __2  [a ( P u m ) P u m (1 −  P u m ) ] 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) du} 
 ≥  η m {− rE ∫ 0  τ m  e −ru ψ ( P u m ) du + E ∫ 0  τ m  e −ru  1 __2  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) du} 
 =  η m E ∫ 0  τ m  e −ru [ 1 __2  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) − r ψ ( P u m ) ] du. 
Now, we reason separately for the two cases.
First, suppose  ψ is convex and (around  p ) below  v . Then,
  η m = v ( p m ) − ψ ( p m ) 
 ≥ E [ ∫ 0  τ m  e −u  e − ∫ 0 u s ( P  u ˆ m ) d u ˆ du +  e − τ m   e − ∫ 0  τ m  s ( P  u ˆ m ) du v ( P  τ m  m ) ] − ψ ( p m ) 
 ≥ E { ∫ 0  τ m  e − (1+ s –) u du +  [ e − (1+ s –) τ m  ψ ( P  τ m  m ) − ψ ( p m ) ] } 
 ≥ E ∫ 
0
 
 τ m 
 e − (1+ s –) u [1 +  1 __2  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) −  (1 +  s –) ψ ( P u m ) ] du 
  ⇒  √ _ η m ≥ E  τ m  _____  √ __ η m  
1 ___  τ m  ∫ 0  τ m  e − (1+ s –) u [1 +  1 __2  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) −  (1 +  s –) ψ ( P u m ) ] du. 
Taking limits as  m → ∞ , (and applying the mean value theorem) tells 
us  0 ≥ 1 + (1/2)  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( p) −  (1 +  s –) v ( p) , as required.
Next, suppose  ψ is concave and (around  p ) above  v .
By choice of  a m ,
  η m − ζ √ _ | η m | = v ( p m ) − ψ ( p m ) − ζ  √ _ | η m |
 ≤ E [ ∫ 0  τ m  e −u e − ∫ 0 u s ( P  u ˆ m ) d u ˆ du +  e − τ m  e − ∫ 0  τ m  s ( P  u ˆ m ) d u ˆ v ( P  τ m  m ) ] − ψ ( p m ) 
 ≤ E [ ∫ 0  τ m  e −u du +  e − τ m  v ( P  τ m  m ) ] − ψ ( p m ) 
 ≤ E ∫ 
0
 
 τ m 
 e −u [1 +  1 __2  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) − ψ ( P u m ) ] du 
  ⇒ − √ _ | η m | − ζ ≤ E  τ m  _____  √  η m  1 ___  τ m  ∫ 0  τ m  e −u [1 +  1 __2  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( P u m ) − ψ ( P u m ) ] du. 
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Taking limits now yields  − ζ ≤ 1 + (1/2) σ _ 2 ψ″ ( p) − v ( p) . Since this is 
true for  arbitrary  ζ > 0 , we conclude that  v ( p) ≤ 1 + (1/2)  σ _ 2 ψ″ ( p) , 
as required. ∎
LEMMA 5: Let  p ∈  (0, 1) be such that  s ( p) is finite. Let  v = v ( · | a, s) for some 
fixed  a ∈  , or let  v =  sup a∈ v ( · | a, s) . Then  v is differentiable at  p .
PROOF: 
By Lemma 1,  v is continuous at  p . Then, by Lemma 2, both  one-sided derivatives 
exist: call them  v − ′ ( p) and  v + ′ ( p) from the left and right, respectively. It remains to 
show that  v − ′ ( p) =  v + ′ ( p) .
Let  s – ∈  ℝ + be some local upper bound for  s around  p , and let 
 σ _ ∈  (0, p (1 − p) a _ ) a local lower bound for  q ↦ q(1 − q)a(q) around  p . Take 
any  λ > 0 .
If  ∃ κ ∈  ( v − ′ (p) ,  v + ′ (p) ) , then letting  ψ (q) ≔ v ( p) + κ (q − p) + λ (q − p) 2 , 
Lemma 4 (i) tells us that  v (p) ≥  (1 +  σ _ 2 λ) / (1 +  s –) . If  ∃ κ ∈  ( v + ′ ( p) ,  v − ′ ( p) ) , 
then letting  ψ (q) ≔ v ( p) + κ (q − p) − λ (q − p) 2 , Lemma 4(ii) tells us that 
 v ( p) ≤ 1 −  σ _ 2 λ .
In either case, the making  λ arbitrarily large would violate  0 ≤ v ≤ 1 . So it 
must be that the  one-sided derivatives match. ∎
B. Necessary Conditions for Equilibrium
In this subsection, we collect some features that must be true of an arbitrary 
 equilibrium. Together, these results will leave us with a unique candidate.
The following lemma is our first step towards characterizing the entire set of 
 equilibria. We show that, as the worker wishes to be employed for as long as 
 possible, he seeks to minimize the flow of information whenever his job is secure 
for the moment. Moreover, as the worker’s behavior is consistent at such beliefs, 
the firm’s behavior takes a similar form to that of a standard  one-player bandit 
 problem:  the set of beliefs at which the worker is never fired will just be every 
belief above a certain cutoff.
LEMMA 6: In any unrefined equilibrium  (a, s) , there is a cutoff  p H ∈  (0, 1) such 
that  {p ∈  [0, 1] : π (p) = 0} =  [0,  p H ] , and  a  ( p H ,1] =  a _ .
PROOF: 
First we show the following claim: If  0 ≤  p 0 <  p 1 ≤ 1 , and  (  p 0 ,  p 1 ) is a 
 maximal interval  I such that  π ( p) > 0 ∀ p ∈ I , then  a|  ( p 0 ,  p 1 )  =  a _ , and  p 1 = 1 .
Firm best response implies  s|  ( p 0 ,  p 1 )  is  finite-valued and almost everywhere zero. 
Then, over any subinterval of  I where  v is  C 2 , we have
  v ( p) = 1 +  1 __2  p 2  (1 − p) 2  max a∈ [ a _ , a –]  { a 
2 v″ ( p) } . 
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For  p ̃ ≈ 0 , the firm optimally stops irrespective of worker behavior. This 
implies  v < 1 globally, so that the above equation implies  v″ ( p) < 0 . Therefore, 
choosing  a to maximize  a 2 v″ ( p) is the same as minimizing  a 2 , which is uniquely 
attained by  a =  a _ . So over any subinterval of  I where  v is  C 2 , we have  a =  a _ 
(almost everywhere). Then, Lemma 2 tells us that  I is the finite union of such subin-
tervals, so that  a =  a _ (a.e.) on  I .
Now, the firm’s flow payoff is  f  ( p) ≔  a _ p − c for  p ∈  ( p 0 ,  p 1 ) .
Fix  p ̃ ∈  ( p 0 ,  p 1 ) . As  π is zero at any endpoint less than  1 (by maximality of the 
interval and Lemma 1), and belief  1 is a.s. never reached, it must be that
  π ( p ̃) =  ∫  p 0   p 1  f dμ 
for some positive, absolutely continuous measure  μ on  ( z  0 ,  z 1 ) . 
As  π (  p ̃) > 0, it  must be that  f is positive on a set of positive measure. 
Since  f is increasing, it is positive in a neighborhood of  p 1 . Finally, applying 
Rüschendorf and Urusov (2008, Proposition 2.9), it cannot be optimal for the firm 
to stop at  p 1 if  p 1 < 1 . That is, the firm would like to continue, despite a possibly 
negative flow payoff, to the right of  p 1 . This would contradict the maximality of  p 1 . 
Therefore,  p 1 = 1, proving the claim.
Now, using the claim, we prove the lemma. First, notice that there is some 
 p ∈  (0, 1) such that  π ( p) > 0. Indeed, this property is guaranteed for  p > c / a _ , 
since such states are guaranteed strictly positive flow profit. Next, notice that any  p 
with  π ( p) > 0 belongs to some open interval with the same property by Lemma 1. 
The claim then tells us that  π|  [ p,1)  > 0 and  a|  [ p,1)  =  a _ . Finally, let
  p H ≔ inf {p ∈  [0, 1] : π ( p) > 0} . 
We now know that  π|  ( p H ,1)  > 0 ,  a|  ( p H ,1)  =  a _ , and  π|  (0,  p H )  = 0 . Lastly, by 
Lemma 1,  π (0) = π ( p H ) = 0 too. ∎
LEMMA 7: In any unrefined equilibrium  (a, s) , the firm’s value function is 
 π ( · | a, s) =  sup  s ̃∈ π ( · | a _ ,  s ̃) .
PROOF: 
Let  π ≔ π ( · | a, s) =  sup  s ̃∈ π ( · | a,  s ̃) and  π ⁎ ≔  sup  s ̃∈ π ( · | a _ ,  s ̃) . First, we 
show that  π ≥  π ⁎ .35
Fix any  p ∈  [0, 1] . Let  { X  t ,  A  t } t be the stochastic process generated by ( P 0 = p 
and) worker strategy  a ; note that  A is  X -measurable. Augmenting the  probability 
space if needed, we may assume there is some Weiner process  { B ˇ t } t which is 
 independent of  (θ, B, X, A) .
35 An alternative proof of this fact would adopt the viscosity approach to rule out existence of a convex kink in 
the firm’s optimal value function.
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As the flow profit  θ A  t − c is pathwise at least  a _ , we know that  π (p) is 
at least
  π ˇ ≔  sup τ  {E ∫ 0 τ e −t ( a _ θ − c) dt} such that τ is a stopping time adapted to X. 
Indeed, they are optimal values from optimal stopping problems whose objectives 
are ranked for every stopping time.
Next, notice that  π ˇ is at least
  π ˇ ⁎ ≔  sup τ  {E ∫ 0 τ e −t ( a _ θ − c) dt} such that τ is a stopping time adapted to Y, 
where
  dY ≔   a _  __
A[d X + cdt +   √ 
______
 A 2 −  a _ 2
 _________ a _  d B 
ˇ ] . 
Indeed, by construction, any  Y -adapted stopping time can be simulated by a 
( stochastic)  X -adapted stopping time.
Finally, notice that  d Y t = θ a _ dt +  (( a _ / A  t )d B t + ( √ ______ A t 2 −  a _ 2/ A  t )d B ˇ ) , where the 
term in parentheses is itself the stochastic derivative of a Weiner process which 
is independent of  θ . In particular, the law of  { Y t } t conditional on  θ is identical to 
the law that  { X  t + tc} t would have under worker strategy  a _ ∈  . It follows that 
 π ˇ ⁎ =  π ⁎ ( p) (since the firm faces identical flow payoff and identical information 
across the two optimal stopping problems). Therefore,  π (p) ≥  π ˇ ≥  π ˇ ⁎ =  π ⁎ (p) .
Now, we prove the reverse inequality.
Let  p H ∈  (0, 1) be the cutoff guaranteed by Lemma 6. As  (a, s) is an  unrefined 
equilibrium,  π is the firm’s optimal value function given worker strategy  a . 
Lemma  6 tells us that  π −1 (0) =  [0,  p H ] , so that the simple  cutoff 
 strategy  s  p H  is also a firm best response to  a . That is,  π ( · | a,  s  p H  ) = π . 
But  π ( · | a,  s  p H  ) = π ( · |  a _ ,  s  p H  ) , as they feature exactly the same behavior on path. 
Therefore,  π = π ( · | a,  s  p H  ) = π ( · |  a _ ,  s  p H  ) ≤  π ⁎ . ∎
Proposition 1 follows immediately from Lemma 7.
NOTATION 1: Let  δ ≔ (1/2) ( √ __________ 1 + (1/8 a _ ) − 1) ,  p – ≔ cδ/ ( a _ (1 + δ) − c) , and 
 p _ ≔ min { p –, c/ a –} .
LEMMA 8: Take any unrefined equilibrium  (a, s) . 
The simple cutoff strategy  s  p 
–
 ∈  is a best response to  a _ ∈  , and the value 
function  π = π ( · |  a _ , s) satisfies
  π ( p) =  [ a _ p − c +  (c −  a _  p –) ( p __ p –) −δ ( 1 − p _____1 −  p –) 
1+δ
 ] 1 p≥ p – . 
PROOF: 
Let  ψ be the proposed function on the  right-hand side.
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On  (  p –, 1] ,  ψ is  C 2 and satisfies  ψ ( p) =  a _ p − c + (1/2) [ a _ p (1 − p) ] 2 ψ″ ( p) . 
On  [0,  p –) ,  ψ is zero and flow payoffs are less than or equal to  0 . Lastly,  ψ is differ-
entiable at  p –. Lemma 3 then tells us that  ψ =  sup  s ̃∈ π ( ⋅ | a _ ,  s ̃) , and  s  p – is optimal for 
the firm against  a _ . That  π = ψ then follows from Lemma 7. ∎
LEMMA 9: In any unrefined equilibrium  (a, s) , on any open interval 
 I ⊆  [0,  p –] where the worker has a strictly positive value, the worker uses 
 a (p) = c / p .
PROOF: 
Consider any  p ∈ I at which  a is continuous. Note that  s( p) < ∞ because 
 v( p) > 0 . So consider an  ϵ > 0 and  s – ∈  ℝ + such that  ( p − ϵ, p + ϵ) ⊆ I 
and  s|  (p−ϵ, p+ϵ)  ≤  s –, and consider the belief process  { P t } t  associated with worker 
control  a and  P 0 = p . Let  τ ϵ ≔ inf {t : | P t − p| ≥ ϵ} . We can decompose  π (p) as 
follows:
  0 = π ( p) 
 = E [ ∫ 0  τ ϵ  e −t  e − ∫ 0 t s ( P u ) du [a ( P t )  P t − c] dt +  e − τ ϵ   e − ∫ 0  τ ϵ  s ( P u ) du π ( P  τ ϵ  ) ] 
 = E ∫ 
0
 
 τ ϵ 
 e −t  e − ∫ 0 t s ( P u ) du [a ( P t )  P t − c] dt 
 ⇒ 0 = E  1 __  τ ϵ ∫ 0  τ ϵ  e −t e − ∫ 0 t s ( P u ) du [a ( P t ) P t − c] dt, where  e − ∫ 0 t s ( P u ) du ∈  [ e − s –t , 1] . 
Taking limits as  ϵ → 0 and appealing to the mean value theorem, 
 a ( p) p − c = 0 . This condition holds at every  p ∈ I at which  a is continuous, 
and so it holds almost everywhere, as required. ∎
LEMMA 10: In any unrefined equilibrium  (a, s) , on any open interval  I ⊆  [0,  p –] 
where the worker has a strictly positive value,  v( p) is affine.
PROOF: 
Since  v| I > 0 , we know  s| I is  finite-valued.
Consider an open subinterval  J ⊆ I \ { a _ / c} over which  s is Lipschitz. 
By Lemma 2, for  p ∈ J ,
  a ( p) v″ ( p) =  
 [1 + s ( p) ] v ( p) − 1
  _________________ 
 1 _2 p (1 − p) 
 =  sup 
 a ˆ ∈ [ a _ , a –] 
 [ a ˆ v″ ( p) ] . 
As  a ( p) ≠  a _ ,  a –, it must be that  v″ ( p) = 0 .
The above tells us that, if  s is piecewise Lipschitz over a subinterval  J of  I , then  v 
is piecewise affine over said subinterval. Moreover, by Lemma 5,  v|  J is then affine.
Therefore,  v is affine in a neighborhood of any  p ∈ I . As a result, it is affine 
over  I . ∎
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LEMMA 11: In any unrefined equilibrium  (a, s) , there is a cutoff  p L such that the 
worker’s zero value set is  [0,  p L ] .
PROOF: 
Consider any  p ˆ ∈  (0, 1) with  v ( p) > 0 . Let us show that  v|  [ p ˆ ,1]  > 0 . In the 
proof below, we will use Lemma 1 many times.
First, note that  p ˆ belongs to some maximal open interval  ( p 0 ,  p 1 ) with the property 
that  v|  ( p 0 ,  p 1 )  > 0 . We know that the firm best response requires stopping for suffi-
ciently low beliefs, so that  p 0 > 0 . By the intermediate value theorem,  v ( p 0 ) = 0 . 
By Lemma 10,  v takes the form  v ( p) = γ (p −  p 0 ) for  p ∈  ( p 0 ,  p 1 ) , where  γ ∈ ℝ 
is some constant. As  v ( p ˆ ) > 0 , it must be that  γ > 0 , implying  v ( p 1 ) > 0 . But 
then (continuity of  v and) maximality of  p 1 implies that  p 1 = 1 . So  v|  [ p ˆ ,1]  > 0 .
Letting  p L ≔ inf {p ∈  [0, 1] : v ( p) > 0} concludes the proof. ∎
LEMMA 12: Take any unrefined equilibrium  (a, s) , and let  p L be as delivered by 
Lemma 11. Then  (a, s) is an equilbrium if and only if  a|  (0,  p L )  =  a –.
PROOF: 
For the proof of this lemma, it is convenient to work with  log-likelihood 
ratios rather than beliefs. For  z ∈ ℝ , let  p(z) ≔ 1/ (1 +  e −z ) , so that 
 z = log (p(z)/ (1 − p(z)) ) . Let  v ˆ(z) ≔ v ( p(z) | a, s) for any  z ∈ ℝ .
Let  z L ≔ log  ( p L /(1 −  p L )) , and take any  z 0 <  z L . We want to show that instan-
taneous sequential rationality implies  a (p ( z 0 ) ) =  a –. To this end, fix arbitrary 
a ˆ ∈ [  a _ ,  a –) .
For any  a 0 ∈  [ a ¯,  a –] , let  { Z t  a 0  } t be the  X -measurable stochastic process for  log-likelihood ratios associated with initial condition  Z 0  a 0  =  z 0 and constant 
 control  a 0 ∈  . That is,  Z  a 0  satisfies the SDE (see equation 1)
  d Z t 
 a 0  =  a 0 [ a 0 (θ −  1 __2) dt + d B  t ] . 
Crucially, the “ d B  t ” term is the same for every different  a 0 , so that these stochastic 
processes are correlated.
To begin with, we prove the following claim: There are constants  γ,  Δ ˆ > 0 such 
that, for every  Δ ∈ (0,  Δ ˆ ] and  a  0 ∈  [ a _ ,  a ˆ ] , we have
  Z Δ  a 
–
 ≥  z L + γ if  Z Δ  a  0 ≥  z L . 
To see this, observe that
  d Z  t 
 a – − d Z  t  a 0  =  a –[ a –(θ −  1 __2) dt + d B  t ] −  a 0 [ a 0 (θ −  1 __2) dt + d B  t ] 
 =  ( a –2 −  a 0 2 ) (θ −  1 __2) dt +  ( a – −  a 0 ) d B  t 
 =  a –( a – −  a 0 ) (θ −  1 __2) dt +   a 
– −  a 0  ______ a 0  d Z  t  a 0  
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 ≥ −  a – __
2( a 
– −  a _ ) dt +   a 
– −  a 0  ______ a  0   d Z  t  a 0  
  ⇒  Z Δ  a – ≥  Z  Δ  a 0 −   a 
–
 __
2( a 
– −  a _ ) Δ +   a 
– −  a 0  ______ a 0   ( Z Δ  a 0 −  z 0 ) . 
In particular, if  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z L >  z 0 , then
  Z Δ  a 
–
 ≥  Z Δ  a 0 −   a 
–
 __
2( a 
– −  a _ ) Δ +   a 
– −  a 0  ______ a 0  ( Z Δ  a 0 −  z  0 ) 
 ≥  z L −   a – __2( a – −  a _ ) Δ +   a 
– −  a ˆ  _____
 a ˆ 
 ( z L −  z  0 ) . 
Taking any  γ ∈  (0,  (( a – −  a ˆ )/ a ˆ ) ( z  L −  z  0 ) ) with small enough  Δ ˆ > 0 will witness 
the claim.
We now use the claim to prove the lemma.
Notice next that there is a constant  M ≥ 0 such that  v ˆ(z) ≤ M  (z −  z  L ) + for 
all  z ∈ ℝ . Indeed,  v ( ⋅  | a, s) is affine on  [ p L ,  p –] by Lemma 10, concave on  [ p –, 1] by 
the proof of Lemma 6, and differentiable at  p – if  p – >  p L by Lemma 5; therefore it 
is concave on  [ p –, 1] . Next, the  right-hand derivative  m of said function is finite—by 
Lemma 10 if  p – >  p L , by the proof of Lemma 6 and direct computation if  p – =  p L . 
Moreover, these same two lemmas tell us that the function is increasing on  [ p L , 1] , 
so that (being constant on  [0,  p L ] ) it is Lipschitz of constant  m . Then, as a composi-
tion of Lipschitz functions,  v ˆ is itself Lipschitz of some constant  M . The bound then 
follows directly.
Now, for any  a 0 ∈  [ a ¯,  a ˆ ] and  Δ ∈ (0,  Δ ˆ ] :
 
E v ˆ( Z Δ  a 0 )  _______
E v ˆ( Z Δ  a – ) 
≤  E v ˆ( Z Δ 
 a 0 ) 
  _________________  
E [ v ˆ( Z Δ  a – )  1  { Z Δ  a – ≥ z L +γ}  ] 
 =  Pr [ Z Δ 
 a 0 ≥  z L ] E [ v ˆ( Z Δ  a 0 ) |  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z L ]    __________________________________    
Pr [ Z Δ  a – ≥  z L + γ] E [ v ˆ( Z Δ  a – ) |  Z Δ  a – ≥  z L + γ] 
(since  v ˆ is zero on  [0,  z L ] ) 
 ≤  E [ v ˆ( Z Δ 
 a 0 ) |  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z L ]   ____________________ 
E [ v ˆ( Z Δ  a – ) |  Z Δ  a – ≥  z L + γ] 
(by the claim) 
 ≤  E [ v ˆ( Z Δ 
 a 0 ) |  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z L ]   _________________ 
 v ˆ( z L + γ)  (by monotonicity of v) 
 ≤  M _________ 
 v ˆ( z L + γ) E [ Z Δ 
 a 0 −  z L  |  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z  L ] .
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Conditional on  θ ∈  {0, 1} , the random variable  Z Δ  a 0 −  z  L is normally distrib-
uted with mean  − ( z  L −  z  0 ) +  a 0 2 (θ − (1/2)) Δ and standard deviation  a 0  √ 
_
 Δ. 
Therefore, applying the known formula for the expectation of truncated normal:
  E  θ  [ Z Δ  a 0 −  z  L | Z Δ  a 0 −  z  L ≥ 0] 
 =  E  θ [ Z Δ  a 0 −  z  L ] +  std θ [ Z Δ  a 0 −  z  L ] ∙  ϕ ______ 1 − Φ( 0 −  E  θ [ Z Δ 
 a 0 −  z  L ] 
  ______________
 std θ [ Z Δ  a 0 −  z  L ]  ) 
 = − ( z  L −  z  0 ) +  a 0 2 (θ −  1 __2) Δ +  a 0  √ 
__
 Δ ∙  ϕ ______ 
1 − Φ(  z  L −  z  0 −  a 0 
2 (θ −  1 __2) Δ   _________________ a 0 √ __ Δ ) 
 =  [ ( z  L −  z  0 ) −  a 0 2 (θ −  1 __2) Δ] [− 1 +  ϵ Δ  a 0 , θ  ϕ ______ 1 − Φ( 1 ____  ϵ Δ  a 0 , θ ) ] , 
where  ϵ Δ  a 0 , θ ≔  a 0  √ 
_
 Δ/ ( z  L −  z  0 −  a 0 2 (θ − (1/2)) Δ) . Notice that  ϵ Δ  a 0 , θ > 0 for suf-
ficiently small  Δ , and that  lim Δ→0  sup  a 0 ∈ [ a _ , a –]   ϵ Δ  a 0 , θ = 0 . Now, observe that
 lim ϵ→0ϵ  
ϕ _ 
1 − Φ( 1 __ϵ) =  lim ϵ→0  ϵ e 
− 1 _ 
2 ϵ 2  ________ 
 ∫ 1/ϵ ∞  e −  y 
2 
 _2  d y
=  lim ϵ→0  
 e − 1 _ 2 ϵ 2 [1 + ϵ (− 1 _2) (−2) ϵ −3 ] 
   _____________________ − e − 1 _ 2 ϵ 2 (− ϵ −2 ) 
 (by L’Hopital)
 =  lim ϵ→0  
1 +  ϵ −2  _
 ϵ −2  =  lim ϵ→0(1 +  ϵ 
2 ) = 1  ⇒ 
  lim Δ→0 sup  a 0 ∈ [ a _ , a –] 
 E  θ [ Z Δ  a 0 −  z  L  |  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z L ] =  ( z L −  z  0 ) [−1 + lim Δ→0  sup  a 0 ∈ [ a ¯, a –]  ϵ Δ 
 a 0 , θ ϕ _ 
1 − Φ( 1 ____  ϵ Δ  a 0 , θ ) ] 
 = 0. 
Finally, this tells us that
  lim Δ→0  sup  a 0 ∈ [ a _ , a ˆ ] 
  
E v ˆ( Z Δ  a 0 )  _______
E v ˆ( Z Δ  a – ) 
≤  M _________ 
 v ˆ( z  L + γ)  lim Δ→0  sup  a 0 ∈ [ a _ ,  a –]  E [ Z Δ 
 a 0 −  z L  |  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z L ] 
 ≤  M _________ 
 v ˆ( z  L + γ)  lim Δ→0  max θ∈ {0, 1}  sup  a 0 ∈ [ a ¯, a –] 
 E θ [ Z Δ  a 0 −  z L   |  Z Δ  a 0 ≥  z L ] = 0. 
Therefore, for sufficiently small  Δ > 0 , we have  sup  a 0 ∈ [ a _ , a ˆ ]  E v ˆ( Z Δ  a 0 ) < E v ˆ( Z Δ  a – ) . 
That is,  a Δ ⁎ ( p | a, s) = arg max  a 0 ∈ [ a _ , a –]  E v ˆ( Z Δ  a 0 ) ⊆ ( a ˆ ,  a – ] . But then  a ˆ ∈ [ a _ ,  a –) was 
arbitrary.
We are now equipped to prove both directions of the lemma, given  p ∈  (0,  p L ) . 
First, given any  a 0 ∈ [  a _ ,  a –) , the set  a Δ ⁎ ( p | a, s) is contained in  [( a – +  a 0 )/2,  a –] for 
 sufficiently small  Δ , so that  a ( p) ≠  a 0 if  (a, s) is to be an equilibrium. Second, 
it is  straightforward that the maximum defining  a Δ ⁎ ( p | a, s) is attained by some 
 a Δ ∈  [ a _ ,  a –] . But then  a Δ >  a ˆ for sufficiently small  Δ for any  a ˆ ∈ [ a _ ,  a –) . 
Therefore  a Δ →  a – as  Δ → 0 , proving instantaneous sequential rationality of  a –. ∎
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LEMMA 13: Take any equilibrium  (a, s) , and let  p L be as delivered by Lemma 11. 
Then  p L =  p _ .
PROOF: 
First, suppose that  p L <  p –. For all  p ∈  ( p L ,  a –) , we know from Lemma 9 that 
a – ≥ a ( p) = c / p , so that  p ≥ c / a –. Considering  p very close to  p L then tells us 
that  p L ≥ c / a –.
So either  p L ≥  p – or  p L ≥ c / a –. That is,  p L ≥  p _ .
Next, by Lemma 8, the firm has strictly positive value above  p –, and so does not 
stop there. Therefore, the worker has strictly positive value above  p – too, so that 
 p L ≤  p –. All that remains is to show that  p L ≤ c / a –.
By firm best response, there cannot be an open subinterval of  [0,  p L ] on which the 
firm’s flow profit  p ↦ a ( p) p − c is strictly positive. For  p in such an interval, the 
associated flow profit is simply  a –p − c . Focusing on such intervals contained in a 
small neighborhood of  p L , it must be that  a 
–  p L − c ≤ 0 , as desired. ∎
C. Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium
In this subsection, we lay the groundwork to show that our candidate equilibrium 
is in fact an equilibrium.
LEMMA 14: There is a unique continuous function  v :  [0, 1] → ℝ such that:
  (i )  v is  C 2 on  [0, 1] \ { p _ ,  p –} and differentiable on  ( p _ , 1] .
 (ii )  v|  [0,  p _ ]  = 0 and  v (1) = 1 .
 (iii )  v is affine on  [ p _ ,  p –] and satisfies  v ( p) = 1 + (1/2) [ a _ p (1 − p) ] 2 v″ ( p) 
for  p ∈  ( p –, 1) .
Moreover, this function is concave and strictly increasing over  ( a _ , 1) , and so 
(0, 1) ­valued there.
PROOF: 
Given any function  v of the desired form, there are constants  β, K such that36
  v ( p) =  
⎧
 
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
0
 
if p ∈  [0,  p _ ] 
   β ( p −  p _ )  if p ∈ ( p _ ,  p –]
1 − K  (1 − p) 1+δ  p −δ 
 
if p ∈  [ p –, 1] 
 . 
36 Notice that the second order linear DE over  (  p –, 1) has solutions  p ↦ 1 − K′  p 1+δ  (1 − p) −δ − K  (1 − p) 1+δ  p −δ 
for constants  K, K ′ . But then continuity and  v(1) = 1 imply  K ′ = 0 . Similarly, the form for  v over  (  p _ ,  p –] comes 
from affinity together with continuity at  p _ .
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If  p _ =  p – (so that  β is irrelevant), we need to see that there is a unique constant  K 
such that the value matching equation  1 − K  (1 −  p –) 1+δ  p –−δ = 0 holds. This is 
clearly so, with  K =  (1 −  p –) − (1+δ)   p –δ .
If  p _ <  p –, we need to see that there is a unique pair of constants  (β, K) such that 
the value matching and smooth pasting equations
  β ( p – −  p _ ) = 1 − K  (1 −  p –) 1+δ  p –−δ ,
  β = K  (1 −  p –) δ  p –− (1+δ)  [ p + δ ] 
hold. The solution set is the intersection of a positively sloped line and a negatively 
sloped line in  (β, K) space, delivering a unique solution.
Finally, direct computation shows that  β =  ( p – + δ) / ( p –(1 −  p _ ) + δ ( p – −  p _ ) ) > 0 , and  K =  (1 −  p –) −δ  p –1+δ  [ p + δ] −1 β > 0 , so that  v|  [ a _ ,1]  is increasing and 
concave. ∎
NOTATION 2: Define  a ⁎ ∈  and  s ⁎ ∈  as follows:
  a ⁎ =  
⎧
 
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
 a ¯
 
if p ∈  [ p –, 1] 
   c _p if p ∈  ( p _ ,  p –)  
 a – if p ∈  [0,  p _ ] 
 ,
  s ⁎ =  
⎧
 
⎪
⎨⎪
⎩
0
 
if p ∈  [ p –, 1] 
  
1 − v ( p)  _
v ( p)  if p ∈  ( p _ ,  p –) 
∞
 
if p ∈  [0,  p _ ] 
 , 
where  v is the function specified in Lemma 14.
LEMMA 15: Let  A :  [0, 1] ⇉  [ a _ ,  a –] be given by either  A ( p) =  [ a _ ,  a –] ∀ p 
or  A ( p) =  { a ⁎ ( p) } ∀ p . Then there is a unique continuous function 
 f :  [0, 1] →  [0, 1] such that:
 (i )  f is  C 2 on  [0, 1] \ { p _ ,  p –} and differentiable on  ( p ¯, 1] .
 (ii )  f |  [0, p _ ]  = 0 and  f (1) = 1 .
 (iii )  f satisfies the HJB
  [1 +  s ⁎ ( p) ] f ( p) = 1 +  1 __2 sup a∈A ( p)  { [ap (1 − p) ] 
2
 f ″ ( p) } 
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for  p ∈  ( p _ ,  p –) ∪  ( p –, 1) . 
PROOF: 
Let  v be the function specified in Lemma 14. By that lemma, and by definition 
of  s ⁎ , the function  v satisfies the conditions of the present lemma. Let  f be any such 
function, and let  h ≔ f − v . We must show that  h = 0 .
First, notice that  h is continuous on  [0, 1] , differentiable on  ( p _ , 1) , zero on 
 [0,  p _ ] ∪  {1} , and  C 2 on  [0, 1] \ { p _ ,  p –} .
For  p ∈  ( p –, 1) ,
  1 ≥ f ( p) = 1 +  1 _2  sup 
a∈A ( p) 
 { [ap (1 − p) ] 2 f ″ ( p) } 
  ⇒ 0 ≥  sup 
a∈A (p) 
 { [ap (1 − p) ] 2 f ″ ( p) } ⇒ 0 ≥ f ″ ( p) 
  ⇒ f ( p) = 1 +  1 __2  [ a _ p (1 − p) ] 
2
 f ″ ( p) 
  ⇒ h ( p) =  1 __2  [ a _ p (1 − p) ] 
2
 h″ ( p) . 
For  p ∈  ( p _ ,  p –) ,
  [1 +  s ⁎ ( p) ] f ( p) = 1 +  1 __2 sup a∈A ( p)  { [ap (1 − p) ] 
2
 [ f ″ ( p) − 0] } 
 =  [1 +  s ⁎ ( p) ] h ( p) +  1 __2  sup a∈A ( p)  { [ap (1 − p) ] 
2
 h″ ( p) } 
  ⇒  [1 +  s ⁎ ( p) ] h ( p) =  1 __2  sup a∈A ( p)  { [ap (1 − p) ] 
2
 h″ ( p) } . 
Take any subinterval  I of  ( p _ , 1) on which  h is strictly positive [negative]. By 
the above equations, it is strictly convex [concave] over each of  I ∩  ( p _ ,  p –) and 
 I ∩  ( p –, 1) . But then differentiability of  h on  I tells us that it is strictly convex [concave] over  I .
Assume, for contradiction, that  h is nonzero. Lemma 1 then lets us say more.
There is then some maximal interval  ( p 0 ,  p 1 ) ⊆  (0, 1) over which it is nonzero. 
As  h|  [0, p ¯] ∪ {1}  = 0 , it must be that  h ( p 0 ) = h ( p 1 ) = 0 , and  h|  ( p 0 , p 1 )  is either strictly positive or strictly negative. By the above argument,  h|  ( p 0 , p 1 )  is either positive and 
convex or negative and concave. This contradicts  h ( p 0 ) = h ( p 1 ) = 0 . ∎
D. Proof of Theorem 1
PROOF: 
Consider any equilibrium. Lemmas 6 and 8 tell us that, above  p –, the worker 
chooses the low action and the firm never fires. Lemmas 11, 12, and 13 tell us 
that, below  p _ , the worker chooses the high action and the firm immediately fires. 
Lemmas 9, 10, and 13 tell us that, over  ( p _ ,  p –) , the worker chooses an action to give 
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zero flow payoff to the firm, and the worker’s value is affine in beliefs. Lemma 14 
then tells us that the firm’s firing behavior agrees with  s ⁎ over this interval. Summing 
up, if there is any equilibrium, then it is  ( a ⁎ ,  s ⁎ ) .
We now verify that our unique candidate is in fact an equilibrium. Lemma 3 
tells us that  s p is a firm best response to  a ⁎ for every  p ∈  [ p _ ,  p –] . It follows that the 
 mixture  s ⁎ is as well.
Lastly, consider the two worker value functions  v ( ⋅ | a ⁎ ,  s ⁎ ) and  sup a∈ v ( ⋅ | a,  s ⁎ ) . 
Both are functions  [0, 1] →  [0, 1] which take value  0 over  [0,  p _ ] and  1 at  1 . By 
Lemma 1, both are continuous. By Lemma 2, both are  C 2 on  ( p _ ,  p –) ∪  ( p –, 1) . By 
Lemma 5, both are differentiable at  p –. Therefore, by Lemma 15, they coincide:  a ⁎ is 
a worker best response to  s ⁎ on path. Finally, Lemma 12 tells us that  a ⁎ is instanta-
neously sequentially rational against  s ⁎ . ∎
E. Proof of Corollary 1
PROOF: 
Let  v ˆ ≔ v ( p –) . The belief function  v ↦ p (v) is simply the inverse of the strictly 
increasing function  v ⁎ |  ( p _ ,1)  . On  p ∈  ( p _ ,  p –) ,  a ⁎ ( p) p − c = 0 by definition of  a ⁎ . 
Therefore,  F is zero over [ 0,  v ˆ) .
For  p ∈  [ p –, 1] ,  v ⁎ ( p) = 1 − K  (1 − p) 1+δ  p −δ for  K > 0 , so that  v ⁎ is 
concave and increasing there. Therefore, its inverse is convex and  increasing. 
Finally,  p ↦  a _ p − c is affine, increasing, negative at  p =  a _ , and positive 
at  p = 1 . Therefore,  F takes the desired form over  ( v ˆ, 1) . ∎
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